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I. INTRODUCTION
Fatalities from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)1 are increasing at an accelerating rate, and the loom-
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1. AIDS is the end condition of a viral infection. This opinion is held by
the overwhelming majority of responsible scientists and others who are working
in the field. However, there are more than two dozen cases worldwide that ex-
hibit AIDS-like features yet exhibit no sign of the AIDS virus. David Perlman,
A Race to Explain Cases of AIDS Without HIV, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1992, at
A20 (describing reports at the Eighth International Conference on AIDS in Am-
sterdam in July, 1992) [hereinafter Perlman, A Race]. So far, laboratory analy-
sis has shown only that the causative organism, if it exists, is not related to any
of the four known human retroviruses. Id. See also David Perlman, People Who
Have AIDS But Not HIV, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 1992, at Al.
The AIDS agent is the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or HIV. The HIV
virus is transmitted primarily through sexual contact. Lisa M. Krieger, Long-
term Survivors Defy the Statistics, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 1992, at A14. It may
also be transmitted through needle-sharing by intravenous drug users, through
infected blood used in transfusions, and by passage across the placental barrier
from an infected mother to her fetus. Other modes of transmission, such as
biting (which would inject the virus from saliva into a wound), may be possible
but are highly unlikely. Id. Once a person has an HIV infection, the progres-
sion of the disease to AIDS appears to be relentless, although there are, to date,
a few healthy, long-term survivors who coexist with the disease. Id. The rapid-
ity of the onset of AIDS varies from individual to individual and may take many
years. Perlman, A Race, supra, at A20.
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ing shadow of a pandemic2 of enormous magnitude is con-
fronting every region of the world. There is no cure.
In the United States, there were 100,000 cases of AIDS
reported in August 1989, eight years after the epidemic be-
gan.3 In the next twenty-six months, another 100,000 cases
were added to the toll. 4 Through March 1992, the national
Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported that there were
218,000 cases of AIDS in the United States, and 139,000 peo-
ple had died from the disease.5
Grim as these figures are, they pale in comparison to the
dimensions of the worldwide pandemic. The Global AIDS
Policy Coalition 6 has reported that nearly thirteen million
people worldwide now have the HIV infection and that, by
the end of the decade, the virus will infect at least thirty-
2. An epidemic is the communication of a disease within a community,
area, or region at one time. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
762, (3d ed. 1986). In current usage by epidemiologists, a pandemic refers to
the spread of a disease over a wide geographic area affecting an exceptionally
high proportion of the population. Id. at 1629. See also David Perlman, Report
Predicts 38 Million Adult HIV Cases by Year 2000, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 1992,
at A20 [hereinafter Perlman, Report]. The influenza pandemic of 1918 is an
example. Id. So is AIDS.
3. AIDS Cases Grow at Accelerated Rate, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1992, at
A3.
4. Id.
5. Erik Eckholm, AIDS, Fatally Steady in the U.S., Accelerates Worldwide,
N.Y TIMES, June 28, 1992, at E5. The Center for Disease Control (CDC)
roughly estimates that one million Americans are infected with HIV and that
40,000 to 80,000 are newly infected each year. Id. "AIDS and related infections
are the leading cause of death among men ages 25 to 44 in 65 U.S. cities ....
[A]mong women of the same age, AIDS was the main cause of death in nine
cities...." Heavy AIDS Toll Among Baby Boomers, S.F. CHRON., June 16, 1993
at A4. The CDC report notes "the rapidly increasing magnitude of the HIV
epidemic" in this country and the changing composition of the victims. AIDS
Cases Grow at Accelerated Rate, supra note 3, at A3. AIDS cases traceable to
heterosexual transmission increased to 7% of the total (compared to 5% in the
first 100,000 cases), and cases involving bisexual or homosexual men declined
from 61% of the first 100,000 cases to 55% of the second 100,000. Id. Con-
versely, the number of women with the disease in each group increased from 9%
to 12%. Id. The lifetime cost of treatment per patient has risen to $102,000.
Daniel Q. Haney, Cost of Treating AIDS Patients Soars, S.F. CHRON., July 23,
1992, at All.
6. The Global AIDS Policy Coalition is comprised of an international team
of AIDS experts drawn from 22 countries under the direction of Dr. Jonathan
Mann of the International AIDS Center at Harvard University. Perlman, Re-
port, supra note 2, at A2.
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eight million adults and possibly as many as 110 million.7
Across the globe, nearly two-and-one-half million people have
already died of the disease. 8 Moreover, at least ten million
children must be added to the total of infected persons by the
year 2000.9
The magnitude of the pandemic has grown one hundred-
fold since AIDS was first discovered in 1981.10 The world is
confronting a new, virulent, and lethal disease whose impact
may rival the devastation caused by syphilis when it ravaged
Europe in the early sixteenth century.
Without question there is desperate need for a treatment
to impede the growth of, and eventually eradicate, the dis-
ease. The accelerating nature of the disaster makes efforts to
this end imperative. Pharmaceutical companies in the
United States and abroad are diligently searching for a
means to combat the infection.'1 So far, however, no cure has
been found, and it will be years, if ever, before an effective
preventive vaccine can be devised, tested, and distributed. 2
7. Id. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most prevalent area, with over 6.5 mil-
lion current cases of HIV infection, but the disease is spreading rapidly in Asia.
Eckholm, supra note 5, at E5.
8. Perlman, Report, supra note 2, at A2.
9. Id. "In some African and Caribbean countries, 10% of the AIDS cases
are in children under the age of five." Carol Levine, Children in HIVIAIDS
Clinical Trials: Still Vulnerable after All These Years, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 231, 232 (1991) (citing UNICEF, CHILDREN AND AIDS: AN IMPENDING
CALAMITY 1, 4-5 (1990)). In the United States, "AIDS is expected to move into
the five leading causes of death in children in the next few years." Id. (citing
SECRETARY'S WORK GROUP ON PEDIATRIC HIV INFECTION AND DISEASE, DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., FINAL REPORT 1, 7 (1988)).
10. Perlman, Report, supra note 2, at A2. Unlike earlier years, when many
American observers perceived AIDS as primarily an affliction restricted to
homosexuals and intravenous drug users, there is now an appreciation that, in
other parts of the world, AIDS overwhelmingly spreads through heterosexual
contact. Id. Indeed, homosexual relations and intravenous drug use account
for only 22% of all cases of HIV infection worldwide, whereas heterosexual rela-
tions account for 71%. Id. See also Eckholm, supra note 5, at E5. Women are
the fastest-growing group of HIV-infected people and now constitute close to
half of all cases. David Perlman, Women Face Growing Risk from AIDS, S.F.
CHRON., July 21, 1992, at Al. As noted earlier, this same trend is evident in the
United States. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. See Susan Okie, AIDS Vaccine Test Planned-It May Be Misguided,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 1992, at A5. See also Kellen F. Cloney, Note, AIDS Vac-
cine Manufacturers v. Tort Regime: The Need for Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 559, 561 (1992).
12. There are two possible kinds of vaccines. See David Perlman, New Re-
ports of Progress on Post-AIDS Therapies, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 1993, at Al
[hereinafter Perlman, New Reports]. One, a therapeutic vaccine, is designed to
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Formidable obstacles lie in the path, yet a preventive vaccine,
if it can be developed, would be a near-miraculous remedy for
the afflicted populations of the world. Like smallpox, this
dreadful scourge might then pass away.
This article addresses the legal impediments to the de-
velopment and distribution of a preventive vaccine, focusing
on both the perception of these impediments and their sub-
stantive reality. First, the article describes the detailed regu-
lations of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with re-
spect to the testing and approval of new drugs and vaccines.
Next, the article provides a background description of the liti-
gation that has beset the pharmaceutical industry in recent
years. The article then discusses whether there is a litigation
crisis that may dissuade drug companies from manufacturing
and distributing an AIDS vaccine. The article also discusses
the extent to which punitive damage verdicts in the product
liability area impede innovation and the extent to which doc-
trinal developments in product liability law chill or encourage
the distribution of drugs and vaccines. Four statutes that
provide varying degrees of protection to vaccine manufactur-
ers are described and analyzed. Lastly, recommendations for
a federal statute are set forth that attempt to ensure fair
compensation to those who are injured through administra-
tion of a vaccine while limiting the scope of liability.13
stop the progression of a disease once an infection has already occurred. Id.
Another, a preventive vaccine, is administered to stop infection from occurring
at all. Id. Unless otherwise designated for the sake of clarity, this article uses
the term "vaccine" to include both types.
13. In the United States, legal impediments to the development of a preven-
tive vaccine are primarily in the form of suits based on a theory of product lia-
bility. As written, this article is not intended to slight the problems associated
with the development of a therapeutic vaccine. However, most, if not all, of the
issues related to the development of a preventive vaccine will apply-though
obviously in a different context-to the development of a therapeutic vaccine.
There are two major differences: (1) testing of a therapeutic vaccine will take
place with consenting individuals who have already contracted an HIV infec-
tion, and (2) the time frame for determining the vaccine's efficacy will be rela-
tively brief.
In the development of either kind of vaccine, the initial problem to be con-
fronted is the variable nature of the virus itself, which mutates rapidly and
exists in thousands of forms. Vaccine Guards Monkeys from Simian AIDS, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 24, 1992, at A12. See also Larry Gostin, Vaccination for AIDS:
Legal and Ethical Challenges From the Test Tube, to the Human Subject,
Through to the Marketplace, 2 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 9, 10 (1987). There are
seven distinct groups found in different regions of the world (although Africa
contains six of the seven), and these groups vary genetically from each other
498 [Vol. 34
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much more than do viruses that cause other diseases. Okie, supra note 11, at
A5. Other reports indicate that there are five distinctly different varieties of
the virus, based upon comparisons of the molecular structure of a major gene
that carries the code for the interior of the virus. David Perlman, New Variants
of HIV Reported, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 1992, at A7 [hereinafter Perlman, New
Variants]. Most of the strains of the virus in North America and Europe are
similar, but they differ genetically from strains found on other continents. Id.
As a result, a vaccine that may work in North America may not be effective
in, for instance, Southeast Asia or Africa. Different vaccines, designed to neu-
tralize different viral strains in different host countries, must be developed.
Their objective will be to stimulate the production of antibodies to attack the
virus directly or to develop an individual's cell immunity to viral attack. Gos-
tin, supra, at 13. Unfortunately, the current tests to determine HIV infection
depend upon the detection of antibodies to the disease in a person's blood, so it
is clear that antibodies alone do not prevent the ultimate disease. However,
they might if already present in a person prior to entry of the virus. Id. Tradi-
tional preventive vaccines are administered in this way (i.e., before a person
contracts a disease), and they are ineffective if administered once the disease is
present. Id.
As is the case with polio, an AIDS vaccine might consist of either a live or a
killed virus. Id. A killed-virus vaccine is preferable, as it would not involve the
potential introduction of infection into an otherwise healthy person. Id. Both
approaches would involve the stimulation of neutralizing antibodies. Id. At the
present time, however, the preventive AIDS vaccines being tested in the United
States on animals involve killed viruses or genetically altered segments of the
virus whose infectious nature has presumably been eliminated. Perlman, New
Reports, supra note 12, at Al, A10. Several small-scale tests of therapeutic vac-
cines on human volunteers have also taken place, and limited success has been
reported in tests of two preventive vaccines on healthy human subjects. David
Pearlman, Encouraging News on AIDS Vaccines, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 1993, at
A2. These vaccines use one or more protein molecules from the outer envelope
or core of the virus to stimulate the body's immune system to produce antibo-
dies to the virus. Id. So far, because segments of protein have been used in
combination with a harmless, natural virus, these vaccines have been safe and
have produced only mild side effects. Id. However, the trials have not pro-
ceeded for a time period long enough to determine whether the initial immune
responses are significant. Id.
With respect to large-scale tests in human populations to determine the
effectiveness of therapeutic vaccines, the World Health Organization has
named Brazil, Rwanda, Thailand, and Uganda as the most likely countries for
these trials because the infection is spreading rapidly in these areas. Okie,
supra note 11, at A5. Thailand is the most likely site for the first large interna-
tional test. Id. Vaccines developed and manufactured in the United States will
be involved in these experimental programs. Id. However, major difficulties
must be surmounted prior to these trials. Id. One difficulty involves the manu-
facture of a vaccine, whether based on a virus or a protein copied from a virus,
that matches the viral strain or strains of HIV in the host country. Id. A vac-
cine designed to combat a particular viral stran (e.g., a vaccine that is effective
against HIV infection in the United States) may be ineffective, or less effective,
in another country. Id. See also AIDS Virus in North Thailand Appears to Tar-
get Heterosexuals, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 1992, at A10. Moreover, as there are
multiple strains of the virus, it may be necessary to employ multiple vaccines in
order to immunize a given population.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF A VACCINE
In the rush to find a cure for AIDS, the risk, of course, is
that the pressing imperative to develop a vaccine may over-
whelm precautions. There has been a relative decline in the
competitive performance of U.S. pharmaceutical concerns
compared to foreign concerns. The U.S. share of world phar-
maceutical exports fell from over thirty percent prior to 1960
to under fifteen percent by the early 1980s, although the
U.S.-owned share of new drug introductions remained
roughly stable.14 Development of an effective AIDS vaccine
will be a rich prize to the successful producer, and there is
substantial competition to be the first. American companies
cannot assume they will win the race.
However, scientists generally opt for slow, careful devel-
opment of a new mode of treatment. 5 Arrayed against this
point of view, persons at risk of contracting AIDS, particu-
larly those who already have the virus but not the disease,
want solutions now.' 6 As previously indicated, the spread of
the virus is increasing at an exponential rate, there is no
known cure, and there is little hope that the behaviors that
spread the disease can be readily or rapidly modified. 17 Aside
from the pressure of competition, therefore, there is pressure
from afflicted groups to speed up the approval process for any
promising treatment and move quickly to human-subject tri-
als without the usual delay, caution, and attention to risk
that would normally attend the development of a new drug or
vaccine. 18
The ultimate goal, however, must not be treatment, but
prevention of the infection at the outset. This is the tradi-
tional function of a vaccine.1 9 Even though a truly effective
preventive vaccine seems far away, when one is developed, it
14. PHARMACEUTICAL PANEL, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE COMPETI-
TIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE INFLUENCES OF
TECHNOLOGY IN DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVE ADVAN-
TAGE 1, 2-3 (1983).
15. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 15.
16. See Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman, Of Mice But Not Men:
Problems of the Randomized Clinical Trial, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1585, 1585-
89 (May 30, 1991).
17. See AIDS Cases Grow at Accelerated Rate, supra note 3, at A3.
18. See Judith Miller, Ethical Standards for Human Subject Research in
Developing Countries, IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES. (Hastings Center,
Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.), May-June 1992, at 7, 8.
19. Gostin, supra note 13, at 10.
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will make little sense to test it on low-risk groups, because
sufficient data to evaluate efficacy will take a very long time
to accumulate. 20 However, particular problems will arise if
field trials take place in endemic areas and with high-risk
groups, such as prostitutes. The researcher is morally obli-
gated to advise research subjects of risk-minimizing behav-
ior; to the extent that the subjects comply, they reduce their
value to the experiment.2' Obviously, the efficacy of a vac-
cine administered to prostitutes in an endemic area can be
most readily ascertained if they continue to engage in risk-
maximizing behavior and then either do or do not fall prey to
the virus.
Even if initial trials take place in developing countries
where the human immunodeficiency virus is highly prevalent
and the need most urgent, there must also be experimenta-
tion on subjects in this country. Such research has begun.
The multiple strains of the virus, and the multiple vaccines
that may have to be developed to combat it, make this neces-
22sary. The viral group in North America and Europe is not
identical to groups elsewhere.23 In this country also, there
will be pressure to proceed quickly and to dispense with the
formal procedures usually imposed in the development of new
medical technologies.24 These procedures are mandated by
federal statute and interpreted in regulations promulgated
by the FDA.25 According to the recommendations proposed at
the recent meeting of the Council of International Organiza-
tions of Medical Sciences, the ethical standards governing re-
search in a host country should at least be equivalent to the
standards in an initiating country.2 s Scientific merit would
be assessed in the initiating country, and the host country
would assume responsibility for the selection of subjects, ap-
20. David J. Rothman, Ethical and Social Issues in the Development of New
Drugs and Vaccines, 63 BULL. OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF MED. 557, 565. (1987).
21. Id. at 567. See also Larry Gostin, Ethical Principles for the Conduct of
Human Subject Research: Population-Based Research and Ethics, 19 LAw, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 191, 193-95 (1991).
22. See Okie, supra note 11 at A5; see also Lisa M. Krieger, AIDS Vaccine
Speedup Urged, S.F. EXAmINER, July 21, 1992, at Al, A15.
23. Perlman, New Variants, supra note 13, at A7.
24. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 15.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 28-42.
26. Miller, supra note 18, at 7; see infra notes 37-38 with respect to FDA
requirements.
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propriate consent, and feasibility of the study in light of the
country's laws, culture, and local conditions.27
A. Food and Drug Administration Requirements
The procedures required by the FDA for its approval of a
new drug or vaccine are elaborate, although the process has
now been expedited in the case of drugs to treat and prolong
the life of persons with AIDS. 28 In the first instance, an In-
stitutional Review Board (a multidisciplinary committee lo-
cated at institutions where research takes place) must ap-
prove and monitor a proposed clinical investigation to
determine a drug or vaccine's safety and efficacy. 29 For a pre-
viously untested drug, this investigation is generally divided
into three phases: (1) an initial phase, usually involving no
more than twenty to eighty patients or volunteers to deter-
mine whether it is safe to proceed to the next phase, (2) a
middle phase, usually involving several hundred subjects to
evaluate effectiveness and short-term side effects, and (3) a
final phase, often involving several hundred to several thou-
sand subjects, to evaluate the overall risk-benefit ratio and to
gather additional information about safety.30
Protocols, reviewed by the Institutional Review Board,
are required for each phase.31 The investigational new-drug
application must contain adequate information about the
pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug in ani-
mals or in vitro to conclude that a clinical investigation will
be reasonably safe.32 Investigators must make sure that pa-
tients or volunteers are informed that the drug is being used
for investigational purposes, and they must give their in-
formed consent.33
27. Id. at 7-8.
28. The FDA has sped approvals of AIDS drugs, but "[on the average, de-
velopment of a new drug takes about a decade and costs $231 million. In 1991,
final FDA reviews alone had averaged 21h years." Carolyn Lochhead, FDA As-
sailed for Slow Testing of New Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1992, at Al, A4.
The cost should be reduced about 25% to account for tax savings derived from
research and development expenses. Alex Barnum, New Study on Drug Prices,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1993, at D1.
29. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1)(iv) (1992).
30. Id. § 312.21(a)-(c).
31. Id. § 312.23(a)(6)(i)-(ii).
32. Id. § 312. 23(a)(8).
33. Id. § 312.53(c)(1)(vi)(d).
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Once an investigation is underway, the sponsor must no-
tify the FDA of any adverse experience associated with use of
the investigational drug that is both serious and unex-
pected. 34 The FDA may request modification of, or termi-
nate, an investigation if it finds that human subjects are be-
ing exposed to unreasonable risk of illness or injury, or that
manufacturing methods or processes are inadequate to en-
sure subject safety.3 5
An application will be approved by the FDA if a drug (or
vaccine) meets statutory standards for safety and effective-
ness, manufacturing and controls, and labeling.36 In addi-
tion, an application based on foreign clinical data meeting
U.S. criteria for marketing approval may be approved 37 if the
foreign data are applicable to the U.S. population, the studies
have been conducted by clinical investigators of recognized
competence, and the data are valid without an on-site inspec-
tion conducted by the FDA.38 However, approval will be
withheld if, among other criteria: a drug is unsafe under pre-
scribed or recommended conditions; the methods used in
manufacture, processing, packing and holding do not comply
with good manufacturing practice; or the labeling is false or
misleading.3 9 A label, for example, must be prominently dis-
34. Id. §§ 312.32(c), 312.50. In addition, annual reports are required that
include information regarding frequent, adverse experiences and deaths. Id.
§ 312.33(b)(1), (b)(3). The investigator must also report any unanticipated
problems involving human subjects to the Institutional Review Board. Id.
§ 312.66.
35. Id. §§ 312.42(b), 312.44(b).
36. Id. § 314.105(c).
37. Foreign clinical studies can be accepted by the FDA for marketing ap-
proval if they are well designed, well conducted, performed by qualified investi-
gators, and conducted in accordance with the ethical principles stated in the
Declaration of Helsinki or the laws and regulations of the country in which the
research was conducted, whichever affords greater protection to the research
subject. Id. § 312.120(a), (c)(1). As with studies conducted in the United States
in accordance with the regulations described herein, the Declaration of Helsinki
mandates informed consent and forbids research where the importance of the
objective (i.e., the benefit) is not in proportion to the inherent risk. Id.
§ 312.120(c)(4)(I)(9). Requirements with respect to investigational new drugs
intended for expert are set forth in § 312:110(b).
38. Id. § 314.106(b) (1992). In the alternative, if the FDA concludes that an
inspection is necessary, it may validate the data through an on-site inspection
or through other appropriate means. Id.
39. Id. § 314.125(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(13). FDA regulations contain detailed
standards with respect to minimum good manufacturing practice, including
such matters as building design, sanitation, packaging and labeling operations,
inspection, and warehousing procedures. Id.§§ 211.42-.76. The regulations
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played and must contain information about any special care
that should be exercised or serious adverse reactions that
have been encountered.40
Finally, no lot of any vaccine "shall be released by a man-
ufacturer prior to completion of tests for conformity with
standards applicable to such product."41 A general safety test
must be performed on biological products, including vaccines,
that are intended for administration to human beings.42
B. Inhibitions on Marketing Once a Vaccine Has Been
Developed
Despite the elaborate testing and review procedures
mandated by the FDA, the lure of profit, and the dictates of
urgent medical necessity, pharmaceutical companies are un-
derstandably concerned about their exposure to liability.
Their concerns are partly perceptual (i.e., based upon opinion
and not necessarily upon fact), partly rooted in bitter experi-
ence, and partly an outgrowth of understandings and misun-
derstandings about legal doctrine. It is difficult to untangle
these concerns, but they unquestionably substantially slow
innovation and the marketing of new vaccines.
The following subsections discuss facets of this problem.
The first deals with industry experience with the develop-
ment and manufacture of vaccines,43 and the second moves to
perceptions about the litigation "explosion."44 The third and
fourth describe and analyze current trends with respect to
punitive damages, 45 product liability law, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the porous defense of compliance with regulatory stan-
dards.46 A subsequent section describes legislation, either
enacted or proposed, to limit liability,47 and lastly, legislation
that should be enacted to speed up the development and dis-
tribution of this critically important vaccine.48
also set forth detailed criteria with respect to the directions accompanying a
drug so that a layperson can use it safely for its intended purpose. Id.§§ 201.5-
.31.
40. Id. § 201.15.
41. Id. § 610.1.
42. Id. § 610.11.
43. See infra part II.B.1.
44. See infra part II.B.2.
45. See infra part II.B.3.
46. See infra part II.B.4.
47. See infra part III.B.
48. See infra part III.C.
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1. Industry Experience with Vaccine Development
Vaccines have been a powerful tool in improving our
well-being and longevity. Vaccines have been developed to
control the following diseases: polio, whooping cough, mea-
sles, rubella, mumps, diphtheria, tetanus, influenza, pneu-
mococcal and meningococcal infections, and hepatitis. 49 Four
decades ago, polio was a dreaded disease that afflicted 57,000
Americans; in 1984, there were four cases.50 In 1934, there
were 265,000 cases of whooping cough and 7,500 deaths from
the disease; in 1982, due to the pertussis component of the
DPT vaccine, there were only 2,000 cases and four deaths.5 '
Yet, despite this spectacular accomplishment, the
number of drug companies producing vaccines has declined
sharply. "Between 1965 and 1985, the number of U.S. vac-
cine manufacturers shrank by more than half; ... [a]nd only
two major companies ... were still investing heavily in vac-
cine research."52 Within the 1980s, the number of firms pro-
ducing vaccines for five serious childhood diseases declined
from thirteen to three. 53
Fear of liability was a major reason for this retreat.54
Vaccines are infrequently administered to each recipient,
sometimes only once in a lifetime. They require complex pro-
duction and quality control processes but provide only a
slight return on investment.5 5 The profit per dose is low, and
yet the perceived liability per dose is high.56 In a strong, if
flamboyant, attack, one scholar has asserted that blame for
this perception must be assigned to the shift in tort law from
negligence (with its corollary, the due care of the individual
49. Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug
Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY
AND INNOVATION 334, 341 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., 1991).
50. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 48 (1988).
51. Id.
52. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 156 (1988).
53. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship be-
tween Product Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 105, 111 (Peter H. Schuck
ed., 1991).
54. See id. at 106; Lasagna, supra note 49, at 341; HUBER, supra note 52, at
155.
55. Lasagna, supra note 49, at 341.
56. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 111.
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or company) to strict liability (with its emphasis upon alleged
defects in the product itself).57
Certainly there are instances that critical commentators
can cite to buttress their claim that modern tort law is a ma-
jor culprit in drying up the number of vaccine manufacturers.
Bendectin, a morning-sickness drug, was voluntarily with-
drawn from the market after a flood of litigation, without ap-
parent end, in which plaintiffs claimed it was a teratogen ca-
pable of producing congenital defects.58 However, the
evidence was, at best, ambiguous, 59 and the manufacturer,
Merrell Dow, did not lose a single product liability case.6 0 It
gave up, however, because of adverse publicity and the $18
million annual cost of legal fees and insurance that approxi-
mated the $20 million in sales.6
In the case of swine flu, which was identified after four
people contracted a severe form of influenza, pharmaceutical
companies quickly developed a vaccine.6 2 They failed, how-
ever, to obtain insurance from insurers who feared undue ex-
posure to liability.6 3 As a result, Congress passed a law insu-
lating insurance companies from liability and establishing
the Federal Treasury as the insurer.6 4 Forty-five million peo-
ple were inoculated.6 5 By August, 1986, there were a total of
4,169 claims for damages filed against the government.6 In
704 cases, cash settlements were sixty times original esti-
mates, or $86.3 million, and forty-one lawsuits seeking $97.8
million in damages were still pending ten years after the pro-
gram began.67
Even a few such instances make companies cautious.
High development costs relative to profit, and the looming
57. HUBER, supra note 52, at 157.
58. See Lasagna, supra note 49, at 337-41.
59. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 102 (stating that respectable scientific
journals said the drug did not cause birth defects). In a recent case, while a
well credentialed epidemiologist testified that no study had found Bendectin to
be a human teratogen, others, equally credentialed, testified that based on
animal and pharmacological studies, the drug can cause birth defects. Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2787 (1993).
60. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 112.
61. Id.
62. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 133-34.
63. Id. at 133.
64. Id. at 134.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
[Vol. 34506
AIDS VACCINE
possibility of financial catastrophe due to the unpredictability
of litigation, are persuasive forces making vaccine manufac-
turers increasingly reluctant to market new products. 8 With
respect to an AIDS vaccine, liability might arise, not from the
failure of the vaccine to prevent an HIV infection, but rather
from a claim that it caused the infection or an adverse reac-
tion or some other untoward result, such as birth defects in
the infant of an inoculated, pregnant woman. Particularly in
the case of an AIDS vaccine, which presumably will be ad-
ministered to populations that have higher-than-normal ex-
posure to the virus, there is the possibility of claims that the
vaccine actually caused the disease rather than protected
against it. 9 Current tests, in the early days of infection, can-
not accurately determine the presence of antibodies to the vi-
rus.70 An apparently healthy subject, who is actually in-
fected, could be inoculated. The causation problem for the
defense, which would attempt to prove that the subject's ill-
ness was caused by behavior and not the vaccine, could be
significant.
In the case of other vaccines, the fear of liability or the
cost of defending against unmeritorious suits has driven in-
surers out of the market or made insurance premiums pro-
hibitively expensive."v Companies are forced to self-insure
and to devote extra effort toward improving the safety of
product design and the sufficiency of warnings against all
conceivable hazards.7 2 These measures may be as they
should be, but the price of the product will invariably rise as
a result.7 3 Because most of the worldwide recipients of an
68. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 12. See also Lasagna, supra note 49, at
342-43 (explaining that a few years ago, legal actions involving the diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP) involved claims many times the gross annual
sales of the vaccine).
69. See Lasagna, supra note 49, at 345.
70. See Wendy K. Mariner & Robert C. Gallo, Getting to Market: The Scien-
tific and Legal Climate for Developing an AIDS Vaccine, 15 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 17, 19 (1987).
71. See Scott E. Harrington, Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices and in
the Availability of Coverage, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETI-
TION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE, supra note 53, at 47, 64-65, 78;
Gostin, supra note 13, at 12; Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 112.
72. See Lasagna, supra note 49, at 343.
73. Id. at 335:
The fear of liability is responsible for much of the increased cost of vac-
cines over the past decade .... Before the liability crisis, back in 1982,
the private-sector cost of immunizations for a two-year-old was $20.17.
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AIDS vaccine will be the poor,74 the cost of the vaccine to
them may be prohibitive. If they cannot pay, it is unclear
that the countries in which they live will have the financial
resources to pay for them.
Much of the evidence on whether tort liability (and the
high cost of insurance) has dampened innovation is anecdo-
tal, but "a common feature of this anecdotal evidence is the
prominence in such accounts of the pharmaceutical industry
in general and vaccines in particular."7 ' And even if there is
no proof of danger, there is a strong, widely held perception of
it. Yet, there are voices, prompted by the dimensions of the
public health emergency, that urge speed in the development
of an AIDS vaccine. 6
One respected commentator has stated that "the fears of
manufacturers are more illusory than real"77 and "[t]he ac-
tual chances that the industry would face liability from a
carefully designed and marketed AIDS vaccine are slim."
78
This is not so certain. In view of the erratic nature of jury
awards, manufacturers have good reason to be cautious. It
appears that low liability costs have a positive, stimulative
impact on innovation, but high liability costs tend to depress
it.79 The vaccine-producers' fears have genuine, realistic
roots, although the interaction between liability and product
design and distribution is highly complex. Another commen-
tator has written that "[b]oth the industry-wide and pharma-
ceutical-specific trends are inconsistent with claims that lia-
bility fears have dampened innovative activities."8 0 He adds,
however, that "limited evidence from all sources suggests
that the tort system has probably reduced innovation,
Ten years later ... the cost of a complete regimen of vaccinations had
risen to $188.19 ....
The Vaccine Scapegoat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1993, at A18. This cost also in-
cluded the added costs for two new vaccines. Id.
74. See David Perlman, One More Problem for Third World, S.F. CHRON.,
July 20, 1992, at A5; Eckholm, supra note 5, at E5.
75. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 111.
76. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 13, at 10.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 12.
79. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 122.
80. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Perform-
ance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETI-
TION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE, supra note 53, at 126, 146.
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although the magnitude of the negative effect is far from
clear."8 1
2. Perceptions About the Litigation "Explosion"
It would not be surprising if the examples of Bendectin
and the swine flu vaccine and litigation related to the DTP
vaccine raised serious concerns among potential producers of
an AIDS vaccine. In addition to these specific instances of
legal difficulty, the perception prevails that, in the last
twenty years, America has embarked on an orgy of litiga-
tion.8 2 This widespread belief is shared by people in business
and the lay public.8" Undoubtedly, it affects business deci-
sions. But how accurate is the perception, and are there par-
ticular problems related to product liability litigation involv-
ing drugs and vaccines?
a. The Litigation Explosion Exists
It appears that people in the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom increasingly refuse to accept risk, and
its consequences, as a part of life and instead are prepared to
shift responsibility to medical service providers and product
manufacturers.8 4 Business representatives claim that "com-
panies have no choice but to avoid the courtroom by with-
drawing products, keeping others off the market, and re-
stricting the scope of research and development ....
Lawyers are frequently blamed. With respect to asbestos and
asbestos-related litigation, it has been said (as if law schools
had no competing demands in the curriculum), that "[a]
whole generation of lawyers has been schooled in asbestos li-
ability theories that could possibly be turned against this or
any similar substitute."8 6
81. Id. at 148.
82. See, e.g, HUBER, supra note 52, at 9-10; DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
RAND CORP., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 1
(1987); Richard J. Mahony & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Puni-
tive Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395, 1396 (1989) (the authors
are, respectively, the CEO and Public Affairs Director of Monsanto); VP Bites
the Hand Feeding Him at ABA Confab, THE RECORDER, Aug. 15 1991, at 6.
83. See Litan, supra note 80, at 144-45; HUBER, supra note 52, at 10.
84. See Michael J. Trebilcock et al., Malpractice Liability: A Cross-Cultural
Perspective, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION,
AND CONSUMER WELFARE, supra note 53, at 205, 216.
85. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1395.
86. Id.
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Former Vice President Quayle added his voice to the at-
tack. In a speech before the American Bar Association in Au-
gust 1991, he asserted that in 1989 more than eighteen mil-
lion civil suits were filed in the United States, one for every
ten adults, and that in California it is estimated that one in
ten jury awards include punitive damages "in amounts aver-
aging more than 3 million."8 7 The United States, he asserted,
is the most litigious society in the world, home to seventy per-
cent of the world's lawyers."8 He claimed that the direct and
indirect costs of litigation and insurance premiums to indi-
viduals and businesses exceed $300 billion per year. 9
This figure, by a circuitous route, apparently was bor-
rowed in altered form from Peter W. Huber, one of the most
vocal critics of the tort liability system.90 Huber has stated:
The number of tort suits filed has increased steadily over
two decades.... Cases where appliances, factory machin-
ery, chemicals, automobiles, and other products are
blamed for injuries increased fourfold between 1976 and
1986. More medical malpractice suits were filed in the
decade ending in 1987 than in the entire previous history
of American tort law.91
Case filings in federal courts, according to another critic of
the system, increased from 51,063 in 1960 to 241,159 in
1983.92
Not only have filings increased, but so have the awards.
Huber reports that there is now an increased probability that
a suit will produce an award, and there has been a persistent
and rapid growth in the average size of awards.93 The aver-
age in all tort cases increased fivefold between the early
1960s and the early 1980s-from an inflation-adjusted
$50,000 to more than $250,000.14 In medical malpractice
cases, inflation-adjusted awards have doubled approximately
87. VP Bites the Hand Feeding Him at ABA Confab, supra note 82, at 6.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 4. Huber's estimate, however, referred
only to tort liability and totaled $380 billion per year in direct and indirect
costs. Id.
91. Id. at 9.
92. See NEELY, supra note 50, at 50.
93. HUBER, supra note 52, at 9.
94. Id. at 10.
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every seven years.9 5 There seems to be little dispute that the
tort field, once a relatively settled and dormant area of the
law, has become an unsettled and turbulent field that has
generated substantial attention and controversy.
96
The number of routine tort cases, however, has not in-
creased dramatically relative to population growth. The ex-
plosion has come in the areas of medical malpractice and
products liability. In some urban jurisdictions, between 1960
and 1984, the increase is more than tenfold. 97 Excluding
cases involving asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin-
problem areas that dominated the case load increase-it has
been asserted that the number of products cases filed grew
338% from 1974 to 1986 (and then declined).9" With respect
to federal product liability cases,
the number of product liability lawsuits filed in the fed-
eral system ... increased five-fold from 1975-1985 (from
about 2,400 suits to about 12,500 suits); because other
types of tort filings in the federal system have not in-
creased at a similar rate, product liability cases now ac-
95. Id. Another commentator has written: "Studies undertaken by the
Rand Institute for Civil Justice show that the average personal injury verdict in
cases involving serious personal injury at least tripled in after-inflation dollars
between the early 1960s and the early 1980s." Gary T. Schwartz, Product Lia-
bility and Medical Malpractice in Comparative Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE:
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 49, at 28,
47. Indeed, the size of some tort verdicts upheld on appeal seem staggering.
See, e.g., Arnold v. Eastern, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984) (awarding $3,027,500 for a hand injury); Marks v. Mobil Oil, 562
F.Supp. 759 (1983) (awarding, $5,147,000 for loss of speech (excluding prejudg-
ment interest)); Hasson v. Ford, 650 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1982) (awarding
$9,850,000 for a fractured skull); Robert & Co. v. Tigner, 351 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986), cert. granted, 354 S.E.2d 158 (1987) (awarding $2,000,000 for a hip
or pelvis fracture); Clark v. Chicago, 410 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(awarding $1,102,000 for an assortment of bodily injuries; i.e., arm, leg, liver,
and spleen); Peterson v. Department, 399 N.W. 2d 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(awarding $7,256,905 for a neck injury).
96. See generally R.L. Raben, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns
of Sociological Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1988-89).
97. Peter H. Schuck, Introduction, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE, supra note 53, at 17, 23.
Mr. Schuck advises caution in assessing the data. Id. Many variables are in-
volved, and studies of the problem use different methodologies, definitions and
data sets. Id. "[T]he most basic factual elements of the debate ... are exceed-
ingly complex, technical and difficult to establish." Id. at 22.
98. Id. at 24. See also HENSLER et al., supra note 82, at 6-7 & fig. 2.1 (not-
ing that the increase in personal injury lawsuits far outpaces population
increases).
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count for about 30 percent of all federal tort filings, com-
pared to 9 percent in 1975. 99
Product liability filings at the state court level, it is said, are
"almost certainly" several times greater than at the federal
level. 100
Many causes for the increase have been cited. Their in-
teraction and importance relative to each other are not
clear.101 Among them, however, "expansion of doctrine"1 02 is
often cited as the major reason for the growth in claims. 103
Mahoney and Littlejohn assert that huge punitive damage
awards are "almost commonplace with multimillion-dollar
awards occurring monthly."10 4  With this incentive, plain-
tiffs' lawyers sue, even with weak cases, until they "hit the
jackpot."1 5 And "nothing stops different juries from award-
ing punitive damages in huge amounts against the same de-
fendant for the same alleged conduct."' 0 6
These risks, whether real or exaggerated, prompt defend-
ants to settle even weak claims. Settlement, in fact, consti-
tutes the bulk of the litigation iceberg, concealed from view,
about which little is known with certainty. There are those
who charge that when punitive damages are claimed (an in-
creasingly common phenomenon), settlements are much
higher-from 60 to 150%-than they would be otherwise.10 7
Statistics in California show "that more claims are being filed
in court, but a larger proportion of the cases that are filed are
99. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, RAND CORP., SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY 2-3 (1986)[hereinafter, HENSLER, SUMMARY].
100. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396 (citing TERENCE
DUNGWORTH, RAND CORP., PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITI-
GATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 20, 42 (1988)). However, caution should be
exercised. Filings in federal courts constitute only a fraction of the total tort
caseload. An estimated 95% of all tort cases are filed in state trial court sys-
tems, and most of these systems do not tabulate cases by type. As a result,
whether the dramatic increase of products cases in the federal system was
matched in the state courts is not known. HENSLER, SUMMARY, supra note 99,
at 3. The data are incomplete.
101. See Schuck, supra note 97, at 25.
102. Expansion of doctrine is the shift from a negligence standard to strict
liability and a greater willingness on the part of juries to award punitive dam-
ages. See generally Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396.
103. See id. See also Schwartz, supra note 95, at 47.
104. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396. But see infra text ac-
companying notes 239-248.
105. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396.
106. Id.
107. Id. In fact, no one knows. Lasagna, supra note 49, at 335.
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settled by the parties without court intervention."0 8 Presum-
ably, as jury verdicts change, the amounts involved in these
settlements will also change as defendants assess their
chances. 10 9 However, to avoid the possibility of a future
plaintiff using a prior, generous settlement as precedent, de-
fendants often insist on secrecy with respect to all documents
and information about a case as a condition of settlement. 110
The impact of these developments has fallen with partic-
ular severity on the pharmaceutical industry. Between 1981
and 1986, for non-Dalkon Shield and non-Bendectin defend-
ants, there was a doubling of the number of product liability
lawsuits filed, and in the latter half of the 1980s "the number
of punitive damage awards in all pharmaceutical product lia-
bility cases was fifteen times greater than in the entire dec-
ade of the 1970s. "111 With respect to vaccines, juries have im-
posed sizable damage awards despite proper manufacture
and warning of the risk." 2 According to the American Medi-
cal Association, "[i]nnovative new products are not being de-
veloped or are being withheld from the market because of lia-
bility concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance.""
l3
In particular, "[c]urrent legal interpretation of product liabil-
ity law, especially the doctrine of strict liability, diminishes
the incentives of a manufacturer to research, develop and
produce vaccines."" 4 "Over the last 10 years the number of
liability suits filed against vaccine manufacturers has in-
creased significantly .... ))115 "As a consequence of the in-
creasing number of suits, court awards, and out-of-court set-
tlements, the manufacturers have been forced to devote an
ever larger percentage of the revenue from vaccine sales to
108. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, RAND CORP., TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA TORT LIABIL-
ITY LITIGATION 3-4 & tbl. 2 (1987).
109. See MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORP., A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RE.
SULTS: TRENDS AND PATrERNS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS 1 (1986).
110. See Ralph Nader & Joan Claybrook, Preserving a Pillar of our Democ-
racy: Tort System Protects the Injured, TRIAL, Dec. 1991, at 45, 46.
111. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1397.
112. See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Compensating Children
with Vaccine-Related Injuries, 1316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1286, 1286 (1987). See
also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that inade-
quate warning resulted in a $200,000 award).
113. ALAN R. NELSON, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 1 (1988).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 7.
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costs of insurance and of defending against potential
liability."116
There is no question that general liability premiums
have risen markedly-from $6.5 billion in 1984 to approxi-
mately $20 billion by the end of the 1980s. 1 17 An expansion
in claim costs (derived from expanded tort liability doctrines)
and a significant reduction in insurance industry operating
income during 1984-1985 (due to a drop in interest rates) fu-
eled this rapid growth.118 Protection against liability, how-
ever, is not a dominant component of product costs gener-
ally.119 Two-thirds of all companies with at least $100
million in sales charge one percent or less for insurance in
their final prices, and for another eleven percent, liability in-
surance accounts for only two to three percent of the final
price.120 The impact falls on innovative technologies, where
there is no accumulation of actuarial experience; in particu-
lar, liability insurance may account for a significant propor-
tion of the price of a vaccine. 121
b. The Litigation Explosion Is a Myth
The Vice President was mistaken. The United States is
not home to seventy percent of the world's lawyers; it is home
to twenty-five to thirty-five percent, roughly the U.S. propor-
tion of the world's gross national product. 122 The cost of the
American legal system is not $300 billion a year, as the Vice
President stated; using an erroneous calculation, he took this
figure from Peter Huber, "who, it is fair to say, made it up."123
116. Iglehart, supra note 112, at 1286.
117. Id.
118. Harrington, supra note 71 at 47, 54-55. Mr. Harrington notes that pre-
mium volatility and the availability of coverage was also "likely to have been
aggravated by cyclical influences that are not fully understood." Id. at 55. An-
other author states that we "don't know the exact extent to which liability law
rather than insurance company misjudgment has been responsible for the so-
called 'insurance crisis.'" NEELY, supra note 50, at 172.
119. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 125.
120. Joan Claybrook, Products Liability: Serving All Americans, TRIAL, Oct.
1990, at 27, 31.
121. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1397.
122. Marc Galanter, Counting Counsel: Dan Quayle and Other Lawyer-
Bashers Build their Case Against the Legal System on Wrong Numbers, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 25, 1992, at 8.
123. Id. at 8. But see Walter Olson, Slowing the Recovery: Too Many Law-
suits, SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB., May 3, 1992, at C1. Mr. Olson sets forth ways in
which costs can be tabulated and concludes that Quayle's "figure may be too
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According to Joan Claybrook, in an article citing the Rand
Institute of Civil Justice study "Costs and Compensation
Paid in Tort Litigation," the total nationwide expenditure for
tort suits in state and federal courts of general jurisdiction in
1985 was between $29 and $36 billion dollars. 124 This esti-
mate includes product liability suits and $4.3 to $5.3 billion
in insurance company costs. 125 She concludes that this is
"less than what consumers spend on cigarettes each year and
half what they spend on alcohol."' 26
A decade ago, manufacturers and sellers, with the help of
the insurance industry, launched a campaign to promote "the
myth of a litigation crisis in the United States that is unpar-
alleled in world history." 12 7 The critics of the critics assert
that there is no litigation crisis, no explosion of product liabil-
ity cases, no expansion of tort theory unfairly advantaging
plaintiffs, and no surge in excessive awards. 12  The charge
that these developments have occurred, they say, is based
upon the increase in the number of cases filed in the federal
court system, but only five percent of the cases are filed
there.1 29
There is, in fact, "a stable curve of lawsuits and verdicts
comparable to the growth of population and inflation."130
From 1981 to 1986, product liability filings in the federal
courts increased by only four percent annually if mass tort
cases (asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin) are ex-
cluded.13 1 This increase is less than the six percent annual
high-or quite possibly, too low. Which is one definition of a reasonable guess."
Id. at C6.
124. Claybrook, supra note 120, at 28. While the figure must include direct
payments for compensatory and punitive damages and insurance costs, it is not
clear whether it includes the indirect costs of items such as settlement, lawyers'
fees, and productive time lost to litigation. Id. These indirect costs could be
high. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 45.
128. Id. at 48. See also Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as
a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE, supra note 53, at 247, 255; NEELY,
supra note 50, at 172, in which the author states that "the average jury award
in product liability cases between 1975 and 1984 rose only slightly faster than
inflation." Id.
129. See Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 48.
130. Id. at 45.
131. Id. at 48. See also Claybrook, supra note 120, at 29.
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increase for all civil filings (many of which were Social Secur-
ity disability claims appeals following a change in the rules
by the Reagan administration) and the five percent annual
increase in personal expenditures for goods.132 Moreover, ac-
cording to a study by the National Center for State Courts,
from 1978 to 1984 the total number of tort filings increased
nine percent while the U.S. population increased eight
percent. 13
3
With respect to awards, the critics of the critics maintain
that compensatory damages are strongly correlated in
amount to the severity of injury, and punitive damages in
turn are strongly correlated with compensatory damages.1 3
4
The burden on corporate defendants is not excessive, and the
scare talk about enormous punitive damage awards is largely
unfounded. In products cases, punitive damages are, in fact,
rarely awarded and often reduced on appeal, although from
time to time juries have imposed significant civil penalties for
truly unconscionable conduct.1 35
Indeed, the argument goes, if there is a problem, it is
that only a tiny fraction of the people injured each year by
defective products actually resort to the legal system for re-
dress.1 36 Yet, in terms of deterrence and prevention, the sys-
tem performs a critically important role. Product suits are
the single most important factor affecting design decisions,
forcing manufacturers to improve quality and ensuring that
warnings are clear and explicit. This result is acknowledged
by industry representatives.1 37 Research has not been de-
terred. Within the pharmaceutical industry, where product
liability suits are prevalent, expenditures for research and
132. Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 48. See also Claybrook, supra
note 120, at 29.
133. Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 48. See also Claybrook supra
note 120, at 29; The Manufactured Crisis: Liability Insurance Companies Have
Created a Crisis and Dumped it on You, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1986, at 544,
546.
134. Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 48.
135. See MICHAEL RUSTAD, ROSCOE POUND FOUND., DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF
TRIAL VERDICTS 23-27, 30 (1991). See also infra text accompanying notes 239-
248.
136. Claybrook, supra note 120, at 27 ("[I]n 1985, 143,000 Americans died
from product-related injuries, 57 million were injured and 2.3 million were hos-
pitalized. The economic cost in 1988 was $180 billion dollars.").
137. See Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at 46; Claybrook, supra note
120, at 27.
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development have more than doubled. 138 An advertisement
in the March 1, 1990, Washington Post proclaimed that
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association companies are
now the principal source of research and development in bi-
omedicine, supplanting the National Institutes of Health. 139
c. The Reality of the "Litigation Explosion"
What are we to make of this welter of conflicting claims?
It may well be that both sides are right-that in hurling sta-
tistics at the opposing camp, each protagonist is describing
different parts of a highly complex phenomenon. 140 It mat-
ters whether all torts are being described, or only products-
related torts, or automobile personal injury torts, or mass
toxic torts, or medical malpractice torts, and so on. It also
matters whether the field of study is the federal system or the
state systems and whether scrutiny is directed toward filings,
settlements, trial verdicts, or awards following appeal. There
is no single tort system, and because so many cases are
brought in state courts (where statistical information is inad-
equate) or are settled in secrecy, there is a dearth of systemic,
empirical information.
It does seem clear that, at least in the federal courts,
there was a growth in products-related cases and an increase
in punitive damages. But the crisis, if there ever was one,
crested in the middle of the last decade, and since then the
situation has been increasingly favorable for defendants. 4'
The number of product liability cases filed has been shrink-
ing. Putting aside asbestos-related litigation, filings in fed-
eral courts have fallen from 8,268 in 1985 to 5,236 in 1991, a
decline of thirty-six percent, without any reason to believe
there has been an offsetting increase in state courts. 1 4 2 In
addition, the number of punitive damage awards in non-as-
bestos product liability cases has declined sharply since the
mid-1980s, and the number of claims per $100,000 in product
liability premiums dropped from 32.9 in 1984 to 17.1 in 1988,
a decline of forty-eight percent. 143
138. Claybrook, supra note 120, at 30.
139. Id.
140. See HENSLER, supra note 82, at 30.
141. See Schuck, supra note 97, at 29.
142. See Galanter, supra note 122, at 9.
143. Id. See also RUSTAD, supra note 135, at 24-25.
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Manufacturers may breathe easier, it would seem. It is
not clear, however, that pharmaceutical companies engaged
in developing and marketing vaccines ought to feel any sense
of relief. They have been particularly attractive targets.1 44
Product liability law may be doing its job in other areas-
compensating victims and deterring unsafe products from
reaching the market-without dealing adequately with the
peculiar vulnerabilities of vaccine manufacturers. Percep-
tion, as much as reality, will dictate decisions to proceed with
testing and distribution of an AIDS vaccine. In this sense,
has the crisis really passed? Several researchers working on
the development of an AIDS vaccine predict that, under pres-
ent legal conditions, if a vaccine were available today, no one
would produce it. "Worries about product-liability lawsuits
could stop any company from marketing a vaccine unless gov-
ernment assumes much or all of the risk."145
3. Punitive Damages
Perception may be as important as reality in the punitive
damages area as well. People in the business community
share a widespread belief that punitive damages are out of
control. 146 It does not appear that recent decisions by the
Supreme Court will abate these fears with respect to the gen-
erality of cases, 147 but the concern about huge numbers of
runaway verdicts is essentially groundless with respect to
products cases-the cases of most concern to vaccine
manufacturers. 148
In this section, after discussing the contours of the prob-
lem in general and relevant Supreme Court decisions, the ar-
ticle summarizes recent research with respect to punitive
damage awards involving only product liability cases.
Punitive damages have a long pedigree. They were first
awarded in this country in 1784.149 Yet retired Supreme
144. See RUSTAD, supra note 135, at 30 ("[Forty-two] percent of punitive
damage awards involving medical products and drug cases were in the top
quartile of awards for all products. This is the highest category.").
145. Stuart Gannes, The Race for an AIDS Vaccine, FORTUNE, Dec. 21, 1987,
at 115, 118. See also R.M. McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on
the Development of a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 943,
943 (1988).
146. See, e.g, Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 188-238.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 240-248.
149. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
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Court Justice Louis Powell has said that they should be abol-
ished. 150 Traditionally, they are awarded on a finding that
the defendant acted with malice. This imprecise term is vari-
ously described as acting oppressively,' 5 ' wickedly, 52 with
an evil motive, 153 with criminal indifference or spite,15 4 or
with such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the inter-
ests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wan-
ton. 1 55 Punitive damages are, in a sense, a holdover from the
ancient days when there was little or no distinction between
tort and criminal law. As such, they exist as a civil penalty
for behavior that may be criminal or that falls in a gray area
between civil and criminal wrongdoing, and they serve func-
tions that also undergird the policies of the criminal law.'56
The principal purpose of punitive damages is "to punish
the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and
others from similar conduct in the future"' 57 -that is to say,
specific and general deterrence. In making the individual-
ized penalty assessment, several factors may be taken into
account. In the words of the Restatement of Torts:
150. Donald B. Benedicts, The Reasonable Man,, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 69,
75. Powell said, "The only standard is that there must have been malice. And
nobody knows exactly what malice is." Id.
151. See Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 276 (1985).
152. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
153. See Grass, supra note 151, at 276.
154. See id. at 270; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
155. KEETON et al., supra note 154, § 2, at 9-10. See also Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (describing corporate
conduct as "reprehensible in the extreme," exhibiting "a conscious and callous
disregard of public safety); Grass, supra note 151, at 276.
156. Grass, supra note 151, at 278, 282. For example, because the penalty is
personal, it does not survive the tortfeasor's death. Id. at 266. Moreover, in
many jurisdictions, it may not be shifted to an insurer. Id. at 283-84. Simi-
larly, municipalities may not be liable for punitive damages in actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, because doing so would shift the burden to the taxpaying public.
KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 12. See also generally City of Newport v.
Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. a (1977). Punitive dam-
ages are "commonly understood to be damages awarded to punish defendants
for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, violence or oppression." Molzofv.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 715 (1992). See also, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL.,
RAND CORP., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 2 (1987). But see Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MiNN. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1990) (stating that deterrence is ineffective).
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Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is out-
rageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider
the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent
of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or
intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.' 5 8
In addition, an occasional court decision has mentioned that
punitive damages may be used to compensate for wounded
feelings or a plaintiffs expenses-including attorneys fees-
in bringing a suit.159
In furtherance of the purposes to punish and deter, juries
have traditionally been given broad latitude.1 6 0  Thus, in
Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors Inc.,161 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld an award of $7,000 compensatory and
$70,000 punitive damages. 162  Citing the Restatement, the
court concluded that the focus should be upon the seriousness
of the acts committed and the wealth of the defendant, not
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979). These standards
have been criticized. If incorporated into an instruction for the jury, Justice
Brennan has said that they may be little better than no guidance at all. Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring). Of the 46 states that permit common law pu-
nitive damages actions, 37 permit evidence of a defendant's wealth to be intro-
duced. See RUSTAD, supra note 135, at 38.
159. See KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 9. Even though there is no logical
relationship between the malice of the defendant and a plaintiffs counsel fees,
nine states regularly allow juries to consider these fees in assessing punitive
damages. See St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d
35, 40 (Md. 1990). Six other states deny consideration of attorneys fees as an
element of punitive damages. Id. at 41. Two states, once evidence sufficient to
award punitive damages is found, permit the award of attorney's fees as addi-
tional compensatory or special damages. Id. at 40-41. Presumably, without be-
ing explicit, the remaining states follow the American Rule; i.e., each side pays
its own attorneys fees. Although contrary to the American rule, awarding rea-
sonable attorneys fees can be seen as a further way to punish wrongful conduct
and to protect plaintiffs against wealthy, corporate defendants who may other-
wise be tempted to wear down opposition by running up the costs of discovery
and trial. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 (1979) (supporting
the concept of allowing a jury to consider a plaintiffs expenses in bringing a
lawsuit as an element of punitive damages).
160. See Jane Draper, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive
Damages Awarded in Personal Injury or Death Cases, 12 A.L.R. 5th 195, 273
(1993).
161. 555 A.2d 800 (Penn. 1989).
162. Id. at 804. For an example of an unusually wide discrepancy between
the amounts awarded for compensatory and punitive damages, see infra text
accompanying notes 217-238.
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proportionality between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 163 If a defendant is wealthy, a proportionate award
might be too small to achieve a deterrent effect. 16 4 In short, if
a civil fine is to achieve its purpose, it must "sting."
Unfortunately, the standards that govern this determi-
nation are cast in very general terms, and most appellate
courts, reviewing a jury award, have looked only to see
whether it shocked the conscience or was governed by passion
or prejudice.' 6 5  These terms invite a near-standardless re-
view of a near-standardless determination. The situation
may have been tolerable when, even thirty years ago, puni-
tive damages were rarely demanded or awarded, but that is
not the case today. It is said that punitive damages are now
sought as a matter of course in virtually all damage ac-
tions.1 66 Additionally, critics have maintained that the
amounts awarded have exploded. Until 1959, the highest pu-
nitive award affirmed by a California appellate court was
$10,000; in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the highest
awards were, respectively, $250,000 and $740,000; by 1988,
California appellate courts had approved awards of $14 and
$15 million.'6 7 These are amounts approved on appeal.1
6 8
The fright factor for a defendant at the trial level can be even
more substantial, although initial awards may be modified at
the appellate level. 16 9 In 1984, punitive damages were as-
163. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 802.
164. Id. at 803.
165. See Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991) (en banc); see also
Grass, supra note 151, at 310.
166. See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 249-50 (1980)
(Elkington, J., concurring).
167. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396. However, most cases
show only a slight increase in the size of the award during the last twenty
years; a small proportion of the total number of awards show a significant in-
crease, and the few large awards are responsible for most of the total dollars
awarded. PETERSON et al., supra note 157, at 42. See also Daniels & Martin,
supra note 157, at 62.
168. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396 (citing Hearings on
Punitive Damages Before the Minnesota Injury Compensation Study Commis-
sion 12 (Jan. 25, 1989) (testimony of T. B. Olson on Behalf of the Minnesota
Civil Justice Coalition)).
169. Recently the Texas "King of Torts," Joe Jamail, won a $550 million judg-
ment against MiniScribe Corporation from a Galveston jury, $530 million of it
in punitive damages. Quayle vs. Jamail, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1992, at A22.
Studies show "that less than five percent of civil actions result in punitive
awards-and many of these are altered on appeal." Harvey Pitt & Karl
Groskaufinanis, The Punitive Damages Decision: The Roulette Wheel Still
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sessed in ten percent of all tort cases in Los Angeles in
amounts ranging from $25.00 to $64 million.170
These results can occur because lay juries, "selected es-
sentially at random," can impose "unfocused penalties solely
for the purpose of punishment and some undefined deter-
rence."'7 Punitive awards are entirely within the jury's dis-
cretion, and a defendant can be subject to them in multiple
lawsuits by different plaintiffs in the same or different juris-
dictions.1 2  Some plaintiffs may lose or settle for modest
amounts; others may receive freakish windfalls. 7  The
awards are given "full faith and credit." 174 A defendant can
be held liable by a preponderance of the evidence, and a jury's
sense of wrongdoing can be inflamed by hearing testimony of
wealth-particularly in the case of a large, corporate defend-
ant being sued by an individual plaintiff who has suffered
horrible injuries-before a verdict of guilt is reached. 175 Fur-
thermore, substantial punitive damages can be awarded on a
showing of only nominal compensatory damages. 76 Most ju-
risdictions do not provide guidelines to focus a jury's
determination. 7
This situation, extensively publicized by a few large
awards, has created an uproar of criticism from corporate
Turns, THE RECORDER, Mar. 28, 1991, at 4. See also PETERSON et al., supra
note 157, at 42. In a notable case involving the polio vaccine, a jury awarded an
$8 million punitive damage verdict against Lederle Laboratories, even though
the FDA had approved the warning concerning its use. See Johnson v. Ameri-
can Cynamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Kan. 1986). The lay jury decided that
the company should have marketed a different vaccine despite reputable opin-
ion that the vaccine in controversy was preferable. Id. at 1320-22. In spite of
these facts in the company's favor, the award was set aside by only a four-to-
three verdict of the Kansas Supreme Court. Id. at 1320, 1327, 1334.
170. See Grass, supra note 151, at 300 n.474 (citation omitted).
171. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 283 (1984).
172. See Grass, supra note 151, at 263, 313.
173. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711 (1993). See also Grass, supra note 151, at 265 and infra text accompany-
ing notes 217-238.
174. See Grass, supra note 151, at 313.
175. Id. at 264 n.173.
176. Id. at 265. In certain circumstances, no compensatory damages need be
shown at all. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054 (Ala.
1992).
177. See Grass, supra note 151, at 265. Justice O'Connor set forth factors to
guide a proportionality analysis in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300-01 (1989).
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America and has prompted measures of reform. 178  In a
number of states, procedures have been adopted to blunt the
worst inequities while preserving punitive damages as a tool
to promote socially responsible behavior.179  Five states
either totally or partially prohibit them.180 Seven states
place an outer limit on the amount that may be recovered,
and in five others, full compliance with FDA product approval
regulations is a defense.1 8 ' At least one state requires proof
of punitive damages beyond a reasonable doubt, 8 2 and others
require proof by clear and convincing evidence.18 3 Ten other
states employ bifurcated trials so that evidence of wealth is
not heard by a jury until liability has been established.
8 4
Others will not permit multiple punitive damage awards for
the same tort.8 5 Seven states require that punitive awards
be applied to a public purpose (the statutes of Colorado and
Georgia were overturned).18
6
178. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1396, 1398; Grass, supra
note 151, at 286-287; Lipsen, supra note 128, at 248.
179. See Lasagna, supra note 49, at 356; Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note
82, at 1397-98.
180. See St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35,
42 (Md. 1990). Massachusetts and New Hampshire do not permit common law
punitive damages actions. Id. In Connecticut, punitive damages are limited to
litigation expenses less taxable costs. Id. at 43 (citing Triangle Sheet Metal
Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220 (1966)).
181. See Lasagna, supra note 49, at 356; Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note
82, at 1398.
182. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1984).
183. Arizona, Maine, Indiana, Minnesota, and Oregon require proof by clear
and convincing evidence. See Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d
675 (Ariz. 1986); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Travelers In-
demn. Co. v. Armstrong, 422 N.E. 2d 349 (Ind. 1982); MINN. STAT. § 30.925
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 52-49.20 (1981). See also Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra
note 169, at 4.
184. These include Georgia, Missouri, Utah, Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary-
land, Nevada, California, Montana, and Kansas. See Mahoney & Littlejohn,
supra note 82, at 1398; Grass, supra note 151, at 286; MODEL PRODUCT LLABIL-
TY ACT § 12(c) (1983) (allowing trial judge to determine amount of punitive
damages after liability established).
185. See Grass, supra note 151, at 287.
186. See Debra C. Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at
88, 91. See also McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F.Supp. 1563 (M.D.Ga.
1990) (holding that Georgia statute U.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 granting state 75% of
punitive damages in product liability cases was unconstitutional as denial of
equal protection and due process clauses of the Georgia and Federal Constitu-
tions); Kirk v. Denver Pub. Co., 818 P.2d 262 (1991) (holding that Colorado
statute, C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102, allocating one-third of all reasonable exemplary
damages to the state general fund was an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation). But see Gordon v. Florida, 608 So.2d 800
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Neutral commentators have also voiced their concern,
pointing out that the purpose of punitive damages falls
within the ambit of the criminal law and should therefore
trigger the necessity for constitutionally required protec-
tions. 1 7 This argument reached the Supreme Court. In
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,188 members of the
Court expressed concern about a punitive damages scheme
where an award would be set aside only if it was manifestly
and grossly excessive or exhibited passion or prejudice suffi-
cient to shock the conscience.189 Justices Scalia and
O'Connor, concurring, objected to the lack of an objective
standard, which seemed "inconsistent with due process."190
A year later, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc.,1911 five Justices reiterated much
the same theme while putting off consideration of the due
process question until the issue was properly presented at a
lower level. 192  With respect to the specific issue raised on
appeal, the Court refused to apply the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment in a case, such as the one before it,
where the government had not prosecuted the case or had a
stake in the outcome.1 93 In her separate opinion, Justice
O'Connor, noting that the Vermont jury had awarded Kelso
$51,000 in compensatory damages (later trebled) and over $6
million in punitive damages, at a ratio of 117:1, made the fol-
lowing observation:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As re-
cently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive dam-
ages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability
case was $250,000... Since then, awards more than 30
times as high have been sustained on appeal... The
threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect
on the research and development of new products. Some
manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have
(Fla. 1992) (holding that Florida statute is constitutional in giving 60% of puni-
tive damages awarded in personal injury and wrongful death actions to the
state).
187. See generally Grass, supra note 151.
188. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
189. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278
(Miss. 1985).
190. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 88.
191. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
192. Id. at 277.
193. Id. at 275.
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decided it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to in-
troduce a new pill or vaccine into the market.
1 94
The due process issue was addressed but not decided two
years later in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.19
Haslip was an insurance fraud case in which an agent had
misappropriated premiums, and medical insurance had been
canceled unbeknownst to the insured.196 The plaintiff, who
incurred unreimbursed medical bills in the amount of $3,800,
brought suit against the agent and Pacific Mutual Insurance
Company. 197 A jury held the company liable under a theory
of respondeat superior and rendered a general verdict of
$1,040,000, of which $840,000 of which was punitive dam-
ages. 198 After unsuccessful review by the trial court and the
Alabama Supreme Court,199 Pacific Mutual petitioned the
Supreme Court, arguing that its due process rights had been
violated because it had been held liable under respondeat su-
perior and had punitive damages assessed against it without
specific standards to guide the jury.200 A large number of
manufacturers and insurers intervened as amici in support of
Pacific Mutual.20 1
The company lost.20 2 Justice O'Connor was the sole dis-
senter.2 °3 In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the court
pointed out that the practice of awarding punitive damages
was well accepted before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 4 Nevertheless, the court also made clear that
it would be just as inappropriate to say that, because pu-
nitive damages have been recognized for so long, their im-
position is never unconstitutional .... We note once again
our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild'....
One must concede that unlimited jury discretion - or un-
limited judicial discretion for that matter - in the fixing of
194. Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7.
199. Id.
200. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7 (1991).
201. Id. at 8, n.4.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 15-16.
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punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
one's constitutional sensibilities.2 °5
Persuasive to the court was the fact that, in the Alabama
scheme, there were reasonably clear jury instructions and
meaningful judicial review.20 6 The jury was told that puni-
tive damages were entirely discretionary; that they were in-
tended to punish and deter; and that they should reflect, and
be proportionate to, the character and degree of the wrong.2 °7
On review, the excessiveness of a punitive verdict was tested
according to seven "detailed substantive standards" to ensure
that the amount of punitive damages was reasonable and ra-
tional from the standpoint of punishment and deterrence.2 °s
Justice Blackmun made two additional potentially im-
portant observations with respect to the constitutional as-
pects of the case. He rejected the argument that a standard
of proof higher than "preponderance of the evidence" is re-
quired to satisfy due process when the preponderance stan-
dard is "buttressed... [by] procedural and substantive pro-
tections" such as those that exist in Alabama.2 °9 More
importantly, he also pointed out that the punitive award, at
approximately four times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages, may be "close" to the boundary separating constitu-
tional from unconstitutional punishments.210
Following its decision, the Court granted certiorari peti-
tions in twelve pending punitive damages cases, vacated
205. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
206. Id. at 22.
207. Id. at 19.
208. Id. at 20-21 (1991). In reviewing a punitive damages award, the trial
court must weigh culpability, the need to deter similar conduct, and the impact
on the parties and innocent third parties. Id. at 20. The state supreme court
may consider: (1) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the dam-
ages awarded and the harm inflicted; (2) the wrongfulness of the conduct and
awareness of it; (3) whether the defendant had profited from it; (4) defendant's
financial condition; (5) the costs of litigation; (6) any criminal sanctions imposed
for purposes of mitigation; and (7) other mitigating civil awards. Id. at 20-21.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued nevertheless that greater
procedural protections are necessary to shield defendants from the bias and
prejudice ofjuries. Id. at 42-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
209. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991).
210. Id. at 23-24. "We cannot say that the common law method for assessing
punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se
unconstitutional." Id. at 17. Nevertheless, "general concerns of reasonableness
and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly
enter into the constitutional calculus." Id. at 18.
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their judgments, and remanded them for further considera-
tion in light of the Haslip opinion.2 1' In one of these cases,
Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology,212 the California Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal noted that out of twenty deci-
sions decided after Haslip (as of April 20, 1992), seventeen
upheld their state's processes for determining punitive dam-
ages (although two found the awards before them excessive),
and only three concluded that their jurisdictions' procedures
were in some way defective.213 In two of the cases in which
the punitive damages awards were upheld,2 14 the standard
for review was "excessiveness" without further articulated
guidelines.215
It appears that Haslip has not precipitated a major
change in punitive damages law by state courts and legisla-
211. See Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Jordan, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. EichenSeer, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 111
S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 111 S. Ct. 1298
(1991); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299
(1991); Pacific Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Portec, Inc.
v. Post Office, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindblom,
111 S. Ct. 1575 (1991); AMCA Int'l Fin. Co. v. Hilgedick, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991);
Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991); Trans-
america Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Koire, 111 S. Ct. 2253 (1991); Fleming Land-
fill, Inc. v. Games, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991).
212. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 1992).
213. Id. at 537 n.4. In Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991), the
California Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff must introduce evidence of
a defendant's financial condition to obtain punitive damages and that "in light
of Haslip, the absence of such evidence raises doubt as to the constitutionality
of a punitive damage award." Id. at 1356. The Court also observed that the
state's "passion and prejudice" standard of review "appears to be similar to
those as to which the high court noted its concern." Id. at 1356-57, n.9. That
standard may pass constitutional muster, however, because California requires
"clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud or malice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1993). Moreover, in
determining whether a punitive damages award is excessive, an appellate court
may consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the relationship of
the award to compensatory damages, and the award's deterrent effect in light of
the defendant's financial condition. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d
980, 990 (Cal. 1978). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, guided by
Haslip, upheld the "shocks the conscience" or "passion or prejudice" standards
of review in Arkansas because the Arkansas Supreme Court had set forth spe-
cific areas of inquiry to test these standards. See Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 979 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated to be heard en banc.
214. See Wolf v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 808 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991); Coyne v. Allstate Insurance Co., 771 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
215. See Coyne, 771 F.Supp. at 679-81.
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tures.216 And in its most recent decision, TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,217 the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have retreated from the position that an award of
punitive damages more than four times compensatory dam-
ages might trigger a due process violation.2 18 TXO seemed
an ideal case to test this proposition. A West Virginia jury
had awarded the plaintiff $10,000,000 in punitive damages
and $19,000 in compensatory damages at a ratio of 526 to
1.219 The West Virginia Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Richard Neely, held that an award of punitive dam-
ages five times compensatory damages should be applied for
"really stupid" defendants, 220 but "when a defendant is not
just stupid but really mean, punitive damages must be
greater in order to deter future evil acts by the defendant." 221
Finding that the defendant had engaged in a "pattern and
practice of fraud, trickery and deceit," the court upheld the
award.222
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a six-to-
three ruling.223 A plurality opinion by Justice Stevens fo-
cused not on the disparity between compensatory and puni-
tive damages, but rather on the difference between the award
of punitive damages and the amount of money potentially at
stake in terms of reduced or eliminated royalty payments.22 4
According to the plurality, the relationship between compen-
satory and punitive damages is only one of "a host of facts
216. Many state legislatures and courts already impose restrictions that ex-
ceed the constitutional requirements of Haslip. See Johnson v. Hugo's
Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the scheme in Vir-
ginia that provided for overturning an award that "is so excessive as to shock
the conscience of the court, or to create the impression that the jury was influ-
enced by passion or prejudice").
217. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
218. See id. at 2711.
219. Id.
220. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889
(W. Va. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 890.
223. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2714 (1993).
224. Id. at 2721-22. Echoing this approach in his concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia commented that in Haslip the Court said a four-to-one ratio between
punitive damages and actual damages may raise a question of constitutional
impropriety, but "today we decide that a 10-to-1 ratio between punitive dam-
ages and the potential harm of petitioner's conduct passes muster." Id. at 2727
(Scalia, J., concurring).
528 [Vol. 34
AIDS VACCINE
and circumstances" to be considered in each particular case,
and the basic concern must be the reasonableness of an
award in light of these factors and whether it is so grossly
excessive that it violates the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause.225 Such was not the case, in the view of
the plurality, nor was there a violation of procedural due pro-
cess. Despite Justice Neely's colorful language, the Court
held that there had been careful and thorough appellate
226review.
Once again in dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Court had "held out the promise that punitive damages
awards would receive sufficient constitutional scrutiny to re-
store fairness in what is rapidly becoming an arbitrary and
oppressive system."227 That promise, she said, was false.228
Noting that the upward trajectory of these awards continues
unabated,229 she sharply criticized the plurality's reliance on
the "potential harm" theory as "an after-the-fact rationaliza-
tion invented by appellate counsel who could not otherwise
explain this disproportionate award."23 ° In her view, the plu-
rality opinion failed to offer adequate instructions to guidelower courts. 231 While she did not dispute that the wealth of
a defendant is a legitimate factor for a jury to consider,232 she
objected strongly to the emphasis placed by trial counsel on
the corporate defendant's extraordinary resources and out-of-
225. Id. at 2721. If compensatory damages are unusually large or unusually
small, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not necessarily a good
measure of whether the award is excessive. See PETERSON et al., supra note
157, at 59. In Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), a case decided
shortly after TXO, the Court held that a civil forfeiture to the government in a
drug case could be disproportionate for purposes of the excessive fines clause of
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2801. The Court pointed out that Austin in-
volved a fine payable to the government rather than damages payable to a pri-
vate party. Id. at 2804. Cf. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelso Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not limit the amount of punitive damages awarded to a private party
"when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages." Id. at 264.
226. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724.
227. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2728 (1993).
229. Id. at 2742.
230. Id. at 2736.
231. Id. at 2731-32.
232. Id. at 2737.
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state status.233 In view of her concern that jury decision-
making can be swayed by "arbitrariness, caprice, passion,
bias, and even malice,"234 she was further distressed by the
cursory review conducted by the West Virginia trial and ap-
pellate courts-a process of review, in her opinion, clearly in-
consistent with due process and the Court's decision in
Haslip.235
For pharmaceutical companies, the TXO decision must
surely be a disappointment.2 36 However, the case was a com-
mercial dispute between two corporations, and the jury's ver-
dict was based upon the intentional tort of slander of title.23 7
As Justice Kennedy stated, "a case involving vicarious liabil-
ity, negligence, or strict liability might present different is-
sues."238 A complaint brought against a manufacturer for
injury or death caused by a vaccine will likely be a product
liability action grounded in negligence or, possibly, in strict
liability. In this more limited context, the available evidence
suggests that, as a practical matter, the concern about run-
away punitive damages awards is not well founded.239
The United States Product Safety Commission has esti-
mated that an estimated 29,000 Americans are involved an-
nually in product-related deaths, and an additional 33 mil-
lion more are the victims of product-related injuries.24 ° Yet,
after exhaustive research, Professor Michael Rustad of Suf-
folk University Law School determined that there had been
only 355 punitive damage awards in trial verdicts in product
233. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2736 (1993).
234. Id. at 2728.
235. Id. at 2740-41.
236. Continuing enormous punitive damage awards are an additional con-
cern. For example, an Atlanta trial court jury recently awarded parents of a
decedent $101 million in punitive damages and $4.2 million in compensatory
damages. See State of Georgia v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993).
237. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 879-
80 (W. Va. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
238. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2726 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). With respect to the claimed basis of lia-
bility, at least in California and Cook County, Illinois, the highest number of
awards are generally for intentional tort, breach of contract, and fraud; the
awards are far fewer when a claim is based on strict liability, negligence, or
breach of warranty. See PETERSON et al., supra note 157, at 46-47.
239. See RUSTAD, supra note 135, at vi. See also Daniels & Martin, supra
note 157, at 38.
240. See RUSTAD, supra note 135, at 23.
530 [Vol. 34
AIDS VACCINE
liability lawsuits during the period between 1965 and
1990.241 The number of cases in which punitive damages
were awarded has risen steadily from 7 in the 1965-1970 pe-
riod to 151 in the 1986-1990 period, but the rate of increase
has slowed, and if asbestos-related cases are removed from
the tabulation, the rate actually decreased during the latter
period.242
According to Professor Rustad, the rarity of awards is
"staggering. "243 The overwhelming number of U.S. manufac-
turers never have a punitive damage award levied against
them, and those that do are guilty of serious misconduct.244
Even when punitive damages are awarded, however, post-
trial reductions are common, and no punitive damages are
collected in 38.1% of the cases.245 Moreover, median punitive
damage awards are close in amount to median compensatory
damages, exceeding them by ten times or more in only thir-
teen percent of the cases.246 Professor Rustad concludes that
punitive damage awards have not skyrocketed, as claimed,
and have not hindered-but in fact, have facilitated- prod-
uct innovation.247 He concludes further that, in the vast ma-
jority of the rare number of cases in which they are imposed,
such damages are "richly deserved."2 48
4. Strict Product Liability
In strict product liability, as elsewhere, the perception of
reality seems at least as important as reality itself. It is fre-
quently asserted that the strict liability standard is one of the
primary agents in dampening innovation and inspiring the
241. Id. However, Professor Rustad points out that the actual number of
awards in product liability litigation is unknown due to the lack of a compre-
hensive reporting system. Id. at 2.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 24.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id. at 31, 46.
246. Id. at 29, 32, 44, 47.
247. Id. at 38-39. One unhappy caveat should be noted, however. Medical
products were the third-highest product category (after asbestos and vehicles)
in terms of number of punitive damages verdicts. Id. at 26. And medical prod-
ucts, including drug cases, were the highest product category in the top quartile
of punitive damages awards. Id. at 30. Unfortunately, it takes only a few high
verdicts to send shock waves through an industry.
248. Id. at 48. See also Daniels & Martin, supra note 157, at 43, 63. There is
no evidence of a nationwide problem, and the claim that juries routinely award
punitive damages in large amounts should be viewed with skepticism.
1994] 531
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
growth of products-related lawsuits.249 Whether or not this
is so with respect to most products, however, it does not ap-
pear that strict liability for failure to warn of dangers that
were neither known nor knowable is the applicable standard
in the case of drugs. 250 The criticism, in consequence, should
not apply to an AIDS vaccine. Before discussing the cases
that reach this result, the origin of the doctrine and the vari-
ous tests that have been adopted to define it will be briefly
described.251
In early products cases, if a manufacturer sold a product
to a local retailer and if a consumer bought the product from
the retailer and was injured by a hidden defect in it, which
entity was liable? Was it the retailer, which might have lim-
ited assets and no insurance, or the manufacturer? The cus-
tomer, it was argued, did not buy directly from the manufac-
turer (i.e., did not have privity) for purposes of a suit against
it in either contract or tort.252 This situation left consumers
without adequate redress for injuries. To right the balance,
over a period of years the defense of privity was over-
thrown.253 The defense died in contract actions for breach of
an express or implied warranty of merchantability and in tort
actions grounded in negligence.254 Consumers obtained the
right to sue manufacturers directly for injuries sustained
from use of a defective product, and, to avoid contract-based
disclaimers and limitations on damages, the preferred route
became negligence.255
That still left a major problem. The plaintiff had to prove
that what the manufacturer had done was unreasonable-a
sometimes formidable undertaking-and likewise often had
to marshal the resources and staying power to combat the op-
posing resources and staying power of a major corporation
249. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53, at 106.
250. See infra text accompanying note 337.
251. See infra text accompanying notes 252-273.
252. See, e.g., Losec v. Clutc, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873); KEETON et al., supra note
154, § 96, at 681; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 30.
253. See KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 690-94. See also generally William
L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L.REv. 791 (1966).
254. See. e.g., McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Berg v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976).
255. See KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 682-83, 692-93; Schwartz, supra
note 95, at 30.
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that typically raised procedural issues or argued a lack of de-
fect or causation.256 The idea that one should be liable only if
at fault (in some way) is deeply ingrained. 57 Nevertheless, it
was difficult to accept the spectacle of a large, wealthy corpo-
ration escaping liability in the face of an injured-perhaps
dreadfully injured-individual whose impaired, mangled, or
deformed state resulted from the use of a product manufac-
tured by that corporation.258 The argument was therefore
advanced that a manufacturer should act as an insurer, be-
cause the benefit of producing for and selling to a mass mar-
ket implied a corollary obligation to reimburse those injured
by its products.259 The manufacturer, it was assumed, could
factor the expense of occasional injury into the cost of doing
business.26 °
Thus, to greatly oversimplify matters, evolved the notion
of strict liability for product defects, a notion borrowed from
strict liability for breach of contract (the implied warranty of
merchantability).261 In this new context, it served both a
loss-distributive and a deterrent function.262 In all likeli-
hood, it has also had a positive impact on the quality of Amer-
ican products relative to the rest of the world, although the
result is regrettably not evident in comparative health and
safety statistics.263
256. See, e.g, Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); KEETON et
al., supra note 154, at 695-96; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 32.
257. See KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 608-09, 615.
258. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 445 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
259. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 6. Huber, referring to them as the Found-
ing Fathers, names Deans William Prosser and John Wade and California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor as the most influential early advocates of
strict liability in product cases. Id.
260. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 903 (Cal.
1963); KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 693.
261. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 519-520 (1977). Strict liability
for defective products was first proposed by Justice Traynor in a concurring
opinion in Escola, 150 P.2d at 436. The California Supreme Court adopted the
doctrine eighteen years later in Greenman, 377 P.2d at 897. "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer ... is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or
consumer... [even if] the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of the product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
Some form of strict liability has been adopted by nearly all states. KEETON et
al., supra note 154, at 694.
262. KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 693.
263. See Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, The Liability Maze, The Brook-
ings Institution, (1991). However, for a contrary point of view supporting the
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Unlike negligence, where the inquiry is directed toward
conduct (i.e., whether a manufacturer acted unreasonably in
light of known or constructively known risks), strict liability
focuses on the product, and knowledge of risk is imputed at
the time of injury.2 64 There are three kinds of product de-
fects. First, strict liability will be imposed when there is a
manufacturing defect (e.g., when out of 10,000 items, one is
produced that contains a defect that causes injury).2 65 It will
also be imposed for a design defect; that is, a failure in the
design of a product so that every item produced is capable of
causing injury.266 Tests have evolved to determine when
strict liability for design defect should apply. One, less popu-
lar today, is a "consumer expectation" test; in this test, a
product will be considered defective, and a manufacturer held
liable, when the danger in a design is beyond the expecta-
tions of an ordinary consumer who uses the product in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner.267 Another test,
currently the most popular, is a risk-benefit evaluation of the
product's design to determine whether the risk in a chal-
lenged design outweighs its potential benefit.268 To this lat-
ter test, companies have asserted a "state-of-the-art" defense.
They argue, given technological capability at the time of man-
ufacture, that certain future risks could not have been antici-
pated269 or, if anticipated, could have not been eliminated.
favorable impact of product liability law on safety, see generally Claybrook,
supra note 120, at 30. See also generally Nader & Claybrook, supra note 110, at
46.
264. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988).
265. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426 (Minn.
1971); Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 332 A.2d 599 (N.J. 1975).
266. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Co., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981);
KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 698-702; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 31-32.
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
268. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Knitz v. Minster
Machine Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982).
269. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cameron Tool Corp., 950 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1991)
(deciding to apply technological capability standard). But see Beshada v. John-
Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (refusing to apply state-of-the-
art defense in strict liability case), modified, Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d
374 (1984). For other cases refusing to apply a state-of-the-art defense in strict
liability cases, see Halphen v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 788 F.2d 274 (5th
Cir. 1986); Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir., 1984); Dart v. Wiebe
Mfg. Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740
P.2d 548 (Haw. 1987); Simmons v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318
(Mass. 1992); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984).
Knowledge or knowability, however, is required in a majority of states, and only
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When a product is beneficial yet may be dangerous if
misused, or is unavoidably dangerous to the occasional con-
sumer even with proper use, it must be accompanied by a
warning of the hazards to be expected.270 The adequacy of a
warning is determined by whether it covers risks that were
known or reasonably should have been known, is reasonably
detailed in terms of substance, and is reasonably clear in
style.27' This is the language of negligence. It has been ar-
gued that the risk-benefit balancing for design defect is also
cast in the language of negligence, so that the strict liability
determination for design defect and failure to warn appears
to be ultimately grounded in a negligence standard.272 How-
ever, by calling the standard strict liability, the inquiry can
be focused in a highly aggressive way on whether the product
design, or the warning, is reasonable in light of the nature of
the product and the potential hazards arising from its antici-
a small minority have rejected this requirement. See Anderson v. Owens-Corn-
ing Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 554 n.10 (Cal. 1991) (citing cases in Louisi-
ana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washington); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d
1189, 1200 (Alaska, 1992).
270. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). Comment k of
the Restatement reads:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs ....
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous
.... The seller of [drugs and vaccines] ... with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, . . . is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to sup-
ply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, at-
tended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
271. See, e.g., Anderson, 810 P.2d at 554 n.10 (citing cases in Lousiana, Mis-
souri, Pennsylvania, and Washington); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839 (La.
1989).
272. See Schwartz, supra note 95, at 32-33 (noting that the key difference
does not lie in a distinction between strict liability and negligence, but rather in
the willingness of courts to apply the design defect balancing test in "a free-
wheeling and aggressive way ... indeed, many recent courts have been willing
to explicitly acknowledge that in design and warning cases negligence remains
the actual standard of the manufacturer's liability"). See also Anderson, 810
P.2d at 549 (taking a position between strict liability and negligence). See also
generally Sheila N. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593
(1980).
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pated use that were known, or should have been known, at
the time of manufacture.2 7 3
This aggressive pursuit of liability has driven many com-
mercial firms from the development and manufacture of vac-
cines, despite a market worth an estimated $500-600 million
a year.274 A principal reason for the exodus is the prohibitive
cost associated with vaccine manufacture due to litigation ex-
penses that have driven insurance premiums so high that
many vaccines are no longer economically feasible to manu-
facture.275 Unlike the case of other industries, which encoun-
tered the problem earlier, this development did not occur un-
til after serious suits began in the late 1970s. Until then,
most courts were reluctant to repeat the difficult balancing of
risks and benefits associated with the use of drugs, vaccines,
and medical devices that had already been conducted by the
FDA.27 ' However, design defect litigation eventually swept
up the pharmaceutical industry along with the others.
Because vaccine manufacturers are subject to the tort
laws of all fifty states, and because each jurisdiction views
the responsibility of drug manufacturers differently, with
some tending toward a strict liability standard, it is ex-
tremely difficult for pharmaceutical companies to estimate
future liability.27 7 Understandably, they have become appre-
hensive about entering new markets and cautious about re-
maining in old ones. In the past, plaintiffs injured by vaccine
products have proceeded under four theories of recovery fre-
quently used in any product liability litigation: negligence,
breach of express or implied warranty, strict liability in terms
273. Employing a "strict liability for defects" standard has an important
bearing on the liability of entities that pass the product from the manufacturer
en route to the consumer. Once the product is labeled defective, all such later
entities become liable. However, the language of Comment k, with respect to
vaccines, is cast in terms of negligence for both design defects and warnings.
See supra note 270. "Comment k has been adopted in the overwhelming major-
ity of jurisdictions that have considered the matter." Brown v. Superior Court,
751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988).
274. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 52, at 153; Viscusi & Moore, supra note 53,
at 111.
275. See John Abelson, Product Liability in a Litigious Society, 240 SCIENCE
1589 (1988). See also Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 82, at 1395 (citation
omitted).
276. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 39.
277. See Joseph Earley, Can Biotechnology Immunize Vaccine Manufactur-
ers From the Products Liability Crisis?, 30 JURIMETRICS J., 351, 356 (1990).
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of design defect, and failure to warn.2 78 Due to rigorous test-
ing and review, however, a vaccine would rarely be improp-
erly prepared.2 7 9 Rather, as with many drugs, the problem
for drug manufacturers is that vaccines are unavoidably dan-
28gerous. s Some people may be injured by their use, and
those people cannot be ascertained in advance. 28 ' They may
contract the very diseases the vaccines are intended to pre-
vent, because the vaccines are too potent or not potent
enough, or they may incur serious side effects.28 2 Yet, for
most people, the vaccines may provide an enormous benefit.
As previously mentioned, the solution has been to re-
quire a detailed warning of the risks that may be encountered
so that each person inoculated with a vaccine will first give
his or her informed consent.28 3 It is in respect to the ade-
quacy of the warning, therefore, that the most troublesome
litigation has occurred.28 4 A review of some leading cases is
instructive.
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,285 the plaintiff was
inoculated at a mass immunization clinic with the Sabin oral
polio vaccine.28 6 He became permanently paralyzed from the
waist down.28 7 Along with two other manufacturers, Wyeth
had been licensed to produce the vaccine after testing on
700,000 to 1,000,000 people, and the federal government rig-
orously tested each lot of the vaccine to be used.28 8 Neverthe-
278. See KEETON et al., supra note 154, at 694. See also RUSTAD, supra note
135, at 28 (stating that in product liability cases, 80% of plaintiffs plead strict
liability, 7% plead negligence, 33 1/3% plead breach of warranty, and 20% plead
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, or intentional tort).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 28-42.
280. See generally Okraner C. Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 TOLEDO L. REv. 799,
817 (1988).
281. See James A. Newhard, Immunity from AIDS Awaits Immunity for Vac-
cine Manufacturers: How Products Liability Law May Affect the Development of
an AIDS Vaccine, 19 TOLEDO L. REv. 885, 887-88 (1987). In most cases, it is
impossible to predict, before a vaccination injection, whether a specific individ-
ual's immune system would, or would not, be able to produce the specific anti-
gens needed to fight a virus. Id. Thus, drug manufacturers may find them-
selves subject to suit for just such an occurrence. Id. at 888.
282. Id. See also Early, supra note 277, at 355-56.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 40, 270-271.
284. See infra text accompanying notes 285-339.
285. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
286. Id. at 122.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 122-23.
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less, the court noted that there was a small but definite risk
for adult recipients of the vaccine. A fact sheet published by
Wyeth represented that the vaccine was completely safe, and
the pharmacist in charge of the clinic was not apprised of the
risk.28 9  The bottles of the vaccine did contain a warning
from the Surgeon General, but these bottles were never seen
by the ultimate consumers, nor was there a "learned interme-
diary" to make the risk-benefit assessment. 290 The court held
that there was a failure to warn the plaintiff, denying him the
opportunity to exercise a voluntary, informed choice, which
exposed the vendor to strict liability in tort.291
A troubling aspect of this case and others that followed is
the conclusion that the inadequate warning was the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiffs injury.292 The court apparently
presumed that the plaintiff would have refused the vaccina-
tion had the risks, estimated at the time at one in one million,
been known to him.293 The implication is that informed per-
sons will never be voluntarily vaccinated if any risk is in-
volved-an implication that would appear to undermine the
social policy goal of reducing or eradicating communicable
diseases.294
Davis was followed by another "failure to warn" case,
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,29 which also involved the
Sabin oral polio vaccine. 296 In Reyes, an eight-month-old
child was fed drops of the vaccine at a health clinic in Texas
and was diagnosed with polio two weeks later.29 v The vaccine
was administered by a nurse without a doctor being pres-
289. Id. at 125.
290. Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 125, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968). In
the case of prescription drugs (which include vaccines), a warning to the physi-
cian administering them, rather than to the ultimate consumer, is sufficient
and may be raised as a defense, because the physician makes an informed, indi-
vidualized assessment of risk and benefit to the recipient. This is called the
"learned intermediary" doctrine. There was no learned intermediary in Davis,
where the vaccination took place in a mass inoculation clinic. Id. at 122. See
also Thomas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir., 1992);
Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992); McKenna, supra
note 145, at 957-58.
291. Davis, 399 F.2d at 126-27.
292. Id. at 129.
293. Id.
294. See generally Earley, supra note 277.
295. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1270.
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ent.298 The child's mother had a seventh-grade education,
spoke Spanish, and signed a release form that did not contain
a warning and that she either did not read or lacked the abil-
ity to understand.299 The nurse had read a package insert
that came with the vaccine and that contained a warning, but
she failed to convey the warning to Mrs. Reyes. 300 A jury
found for the plaintiff despite the fact that the child might
have contracted the disease from a polio epidemic that was
raging in the county at the time.3 °1
In affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated that unless administered by a
physician, the warning must reach the consumer.30 2 Wyeth
had ample reason to foresee how the drug would be adminis-
tered. 303 The court concluded that it had to assume that the
mother would have responded to a warning; there was a basis
for rational choice-a statistically foreseeable risk and an al-
ternative in the form of the Salk killed polio vaccine.30 4 With-
out a warning, all that was present in the case was a strict
liability analysis based upon design defect.30 5
Three years later, the Fifth Circuit considered another
appeal involving the Sabin oral polio vaccine in Givens v. Led-
erle Laboratories,30 6 a case involving a mother who con-
tracted polio and subsequent paralysis following the adminis-
tration of the vaccine to her daughter. 0 7 Unlike the
situation in Reyes, the vaccine was administered by a pedia-
trician in his office.30 8 A warning in the package containing
the doses of vaccine said the risk of contracting polio from the
vaccine was one in three million and that persons in close
contact with a recipient might become infected.30 9 This
warning was never conveyed to Ms. Givens.3 10 According to
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
301. Id. at 1271.
302. Id. at 1276.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1282.
305. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1282 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
306. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
307. Id. at 1343.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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the court, the "learned intermediary doctrine"3 1 ' did not ap-
ply because the vaccine administration took place in an at-
mosphere resembling a small county health clinic, as in
Reyes, and not by prescription in a doctor's office. 12 Under
the circumstances, the defendant was responsible for getting
the warning directly to the consumer, particularly as there
was a failure to impress on the physician the real risk
involved.313
However, in a Kansas case,314 where a father contracted
polio after his daughter received the Sabin oral polio vaccine
from a physician, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant company for $2
million actual damages and $8 million punitive damages.31 5
The jury had reached its verdict despite the facts that the fed-
eral government supplied the seed strains of the virus to the
company, closely supervised the manufacture of the vaccine,
and approved the warning.316 The plaintiff sought to impose
strict liability based upon design defect, arguing that the
risk-free Salk, rather than the Sabin, vaccine should have
been used, despite near unanimous approval of the Sabin vac-
cine in the medical community.31 7 The Kansas Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that there was no manufacturing or
design defect, that the warning to the physician (as "learned
intermediary") was adequate, 318 and that in determining the
adequacy of a warning, the test is reasonableness, not strict
liability.319 In effect, the court asserted that negligence and
311. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
312. Givens v. Lederle Lab., 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977).
313. Id.
314. Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986).
315. Id. at 1320, 1327.
316. Id. at 1320-22.
317. Id. at 1321, 1326.
318. Unlike the Davis, Reyes, and Givens cases, American Cyanamid in-
volved adequacy of warning, not failure to warn. Id.
319. Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Prager states:
[Tihe cases generally agree that an adequate warning in mass inocula-
tion cases requires that vaccinees be directly informed in clear and
simple terms by the drug manufacturer of (1) the reasonably foresee-
able risk inherent in the product; (2) reasonable available alternative
products and the reasonably foreseeable risks posed by such alterna-
tives; and perhaps-in appropriate cases-(3) the reasonably foresee-
able results of remaining untreated.
Id. at 1328 (Prager, J., dissenting).
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strict liability in warning cases are functional equivalents
and that, in consequence, the plaintiff had to show that the
defendant was negligent.320
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited a prior Califor-
nia case, Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories.32 ' Yet another tragic
case involving the Sabin oral polio vaccine, Kearl involved an
infant who became paralyzed after receiving the vaccine.322
The infant's mother had signed a consent form to which an
information sheet with a warning was attached.2 3 The
warning informed the vaccinee that one in every four million
vaccinations result in permanent paralysis or possibly death;
it further stated that there was a less effective, killed polio
vaccine (the Salk vaccine) with no known risk of causing pa-
ralysis.3 24 The plaintiffs case was based upon two theories of
liability: strict-liability design defect and inadequate warn-
ing.3 2 ' The trial court instructed the jury on design defect,
and the jury found the defendant Lederle liable for $800,000
in damages. 26
Reversing, the California Appeals Court held that the
trial court should first have determined whether the product
was unavoidably dangerous. 27 If it was, the manufacturer of
the product would be exempt from strict-liability design de-
fect analysis and would, instead, be judged on the basis of
negligence.2 8 Such a finding would not preclude prosecution
of a case based on strict liability for manufacturing defect. 29
The court further held that, because in all warning cases "the
320. Id. at 1324-25.
321. 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
322. Id. at 456.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 458-68.
326. Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
327. Id. at 463-65.
328. Id. at 463-64. In making the determination, a court should consider
whether:
(1) ... the product was intended to confer an exceptionally important
benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the
then-existing risk posed by the product was both "substantial" and "un-
avoidable"; and (3) whether the interest in availability (again mea-
sured as of the time of distribution) outweighs the interest in promot-
ing enhanced accountability through strict liability design defect
review."
Id. at 464.
329. Id. at 465.
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tests actually applied condition imposition of liability on the
defendant's having actually or constructively known of the
risk that triggers the warning,"330 the adequacy of the warn-
ing must also be judged on a reasonableness (i.e., negligence)
standard even if a claim is advanced under the rubric of strict
liability.3 3 ' In this case, the warning was reasonable and
therefore was upheld.332
In Brown v. Superior Court,3 a case decided three years
after Kearl, the California Supreme Court overruled that por-
tion of Kearl that held that the negligence standard provided
in Restatement of Torts Comment k334 should be applied to a
prescription drug only after a trial court determination that
the drug is unavoidably dangerous. 335 Rather, the court. de-
termined that all prescription drugs are unavoidably danger-
ous and subject to a negligence standard.33 s The majority
opinion stated:
in accord with almost all our sister states that have con-
sidered the issue, we hold that a manufacturer is not
strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so
long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied
by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either
known or reasonably scientifically knowable at the time of
distribution.3 3 7
330. Id. at 465-66. In strict liability, on the other hand, the focus is not on
the reasonableness of conduct but on the product, and actual or constructive
knowledge of risk is either ignored or imputed to the manufacturer.
331. Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
332. Id. at 467, 469.
333. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
334. See supra note 270.
335. Brown, 751 P.2d at 482.
336. Id. at 481-83.
337. Id. at 482-83. In a subsequent opinion, the California Supreme Court
extended the rationale of Brown beyond the drug context and held that there
must be knowledge or knowability before there can be strict liability for failure
to warn. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal.
1991). While noting that "[iut may... be true that the 'warning defect' theory is
'rooted in negligence,'" the primary inquiry in strict liability is not the reasona-
bleness of the manufacturer's conduct but only whether the defendant gave ad-
equate warning "of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge
available at the time of manufacture and distribution." Id. at 558. The distinc-
tion between negligence and strict liability is in practice, however, "without a
substantial difference." Id. at 562 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See also Huft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that an action for breach of express or implied warranty is available to
a plaintiff if manufacturer does not prove a danger is unknown or unknowable).
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The court arrived at this holding for reasons of public policy.
Strict liability would not further the important public inter-
est in the development and availability of drugs at an afford-
able price. Drug manufacturers, fearful of large adverse
monetary judgments and the expense of insurance, may be
reluctant to undertake research programs or market risky
drugs that might save lives and reduce suffering.338 In reach-
ing these conclusions, the court cited the experience of phar-
maceutical companies with vaccines.33 9
For pharmaceutical companies, these decisions are some-
what positive. If a reasonably detailed warning adequately
apprises a consumer in a clinic, or a doctor prescribing a pre-
scription drug, of the risk, the manufacturer will be exempt
from liability. 4 ° Moreover, in almost all states, the standard
for measuring fault will be the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct in light of what was known, or should have
been known, at the time of distribution.34 1 Unless a manu-
facturing defect is involved, a strict-liability determination
will not be made either for design defect or for failure to warn
of unknown and unknowable hazards.34 2
However, the cases present troubling issues sub silentio.
Suits have been brought and juries have returned huge ver-
dicts, including large punitive damages awards, even though
some were reversed on appeal.343 Moreover, the "learned in-
termediary" doctrine has been narrowly construed. 344 Ulti-
mately, AIDS vaccines may be administered in mass inocula-
tion clinics by nurses and public health workers. 341 If a
warning becomes too detailed, encompassing all possible
risks, and if it must be comprehended by consumers who are
338. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Cal. 1988).
339. Id. at 479-80 (citing Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes Huge Price In-
creases in Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339 (1986)). In the case of the
DTP vaccine, liability exposure and the resulting difficulty in obtaining insur-
ance has driven all but two manufacturers from the market. Id. at 479. Justice
Mosk stated that "the cost of each dose rose a hundredfold from 11 cents in 1982
to $11.40 in 1986, $8 of which was for an insurance reserve." Id. The price
increase roughly paralleled an increase in the number of lawsuits from one in
1978 to 219 in 1985. Id.
340. Id. at 477-78.
341. Id. at 482-83.
342. Id.
343. See supra note 216.
344. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
345. See McKenna, supra note 145, at 952.
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uneducated, there is a risk that it will be neither understood
nor read. The possibilities of abuse and liability are genuine.
Noteworthy, also, is the fact that prior FDA approval of
both the manufacturing process for the Sabin oral polio vac-
cine and the warning that accompanied distribution did not
kill these cases at the stage of summary judgment.346
Although compliance with public regulations is some evi-
dence that a design is non-defective, the court is the final ar-
biter of the manufacturer's duty.347 Even complete conform-
ity to standards written by Congress itself will not immunize
a defendant manufacturer from liability.348 Moreover, FDA
studies that find no link between a drug and a defect will not
necessarily preclude a substantial jury award. 49
To be sure, most American jurisdictions recognize a
"state-of-the-art" defense in design and warning cases.35 ° In
other words, a manufacturer cannot be held liable for a defect
that was neither known nor, in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, could have been known at the time of manufacture and
distribution.35 1 A jury, however, confronted with a badly in-
jured or paralyzed plaintiff is still left with discretion to de-
termine whether the defect was reasonably scientifically
knowable, although it was in fact not known.35 2 If it makes
this determination, the manufacturer will be liable.353 And if
suit is brought years after distribution, so that the manufac-
turer of a particular dose of vaccine cannot be identified and
individual culpability ascertained, all manufacturers produc-
346. See, e.g., Davis, 399 F.2d at 121; Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1264, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
347. Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
348. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 47-49. "The manufacturer of a birth con-
trol pill paid $2.75 million in punitive damages for an allegedly defective chemi-
cal formulation, despite complete compliance with all applicable FDA regula-
tions." Id. at 49 (citing Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Wooderson, 681 P.2d
1038 (Kan. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984)); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). But see Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978) (holding that the case should not go to jury due
to prior approval of engine by FAA).
349. See Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986)
(awarding $4.7 million for birth defect following use of spermicide), reh'g de-
nied, 795 F.2d 89 (1986). "An FDA determination that a warning is not neces-
sary may be sufficient for federal regulatory purposes but still not sufficient for
state tort law purposes." Id. at 746.
350. See Schwartz, supra note 95, at 43.
351. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 483 (Cal. 1988).
352. Id. at 481-83.
353. Id. at 481.
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ing the same vaccine with identical levels of risk may be held
liable according to their share of the product market.3 4
III. LEGISLATION AND PROPOSALS
A. The Problems That Need to Be Addressed
If a preventive vaccine is developed, it is not clear to
whom it would be administered. Among other things, that
will depend upon the cost of the vaccine and the extent of the
pandemic. 55 In countries where the disease is spreading
rapidly through both heterosexual and homosexual contacts,
all members of society may be candidates for inoculation. In
this country where, to date, HIV transmission still appears to
be confined largely to specific groups, the demand for the vac-
cine, at least in the first instance, may be limited to the mem-
bers of those groups. Nevertheless, even if the target popula-
tion is restricted, large numbers of people will be involved.
Their need for a vaccine is acute.
The foremost hindrance to making a vaccine available is
the enormous scientific difficulty associated with developing
one.356 A close second in this country, however, is the liabil-
ity concerns of United States drug manufacturers. 57 They
operate within a matrix of legal rules that are imposed by
fifty states and the federal government. In the last ten to fif-
teen years, these rules have resulted in an increase in suits
against vaccine manufacturers and a corresponding decrease
in the incentive to develop and produce a new vaccine. 358 The
international competition to develop an AIDS vaccine is in-
tense. Yet, despite superficial similarity, the American tort
system places a brake on United States drug companies by
354. Id. See also Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10, 13.
356. See supra note 13.
357. These concerns are exacerbated by the extremely high cost of develop-
ing a vaccine, estimated to be $50 million or more. See Cloney, supra note 11,
at 567.
358. See NELSON, supra note 113, at 2, 7. See also Iglehart, supra note 112,
at 1286 and supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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generating many more lawsuits and higher damage awards
than do the systems in Europe and Japan. 59
A way must be found to speed a vaccine to market by
reducing the liability concerns of American manufacturers.
Uniform legislation in all states might achieve this goal, but
its enactment is unlikely. The most feasible alternative is a
federal statute. There are those who argue, however, that no
legislation to protect AIDS vaccine manufacturers is neces-
sary.360 This argument appears to be based upon several as-
sumptions. First, the epidemiology of AIDS makes mass im-
munization unnecessary, and thus a preventive vaccine need
only be administered to so-called high-risk groups. Since dis-
tribution will therefore be limited and, in any event, the vac-
cine "will be too expensive and scarce to administer indis-
criminately," it will probably "be prescribed by a physician
who will have an especially active role in the vaccination de-
cision." Also, because any AIDS vaccine to be developed will
be based upon new genetic engineering techniques, it should
be very safe.3" 1 Under the circumstances, it is contended,
manufacturers should be amply protected from liability by
the "learned intermediary" doctrine, by the inherent safety of
the product, and by existing standards of liability for warning
defects.362
These arguments are unrealistic for several reasons. To
begin with, even if the disease is still largely confined in this
country to certain cities and groups, it is now present in every
state and is also spreading to women through heterosexual
contact. 36 3 The threat is heightened in the face of a virus
that mutates rapidly. 6 4 Therefore, immunization against
the HIV virus cannot be limited indefinitely to high-risk
groups but must, to the extent possible, also be readily avail-
able to others in the population.
In view of this plausible eventuality, it is unlikely that a
physician will monitor the inoculation of every potential vac-
cinee, even in this country. Supervision by a physician may
359. See Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note
49, at 22-23; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 68-75.
360. See, e.g, McKenna, supra note 145, at 944.
361. Id. at 949, 961.
362. Id. at 948-61.
363. See supra notes 5, 10.
364. See supra note 13.
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be the practice at the outset with specific, targeted groups,
but this practice probably would not continue for very long."6 5
In all likelihood, mass immunization through clinics will
gradually become standard practice, and inoculations by
nurses or other allied health care workers will become the
norm.
In addition, it is unrealistic to assume that the vaccine
will be so safe that liability concerns should be irrelevant. It
is true that a vaccine made from a fragment of the viral coat-
ing should indeed be safer than a live or killed whole-virus
vaccine. 66 But any drug, administered to large numbers of
different kinds of people, has some statistical chance of caus-
ing injury or death.36 v As two commentators have pointed
out, because the HIV virus has certain genetic components in
common with other viruses that cause cancer, there is a risk
of a vaccinee developing cancer at some point after vaccina-
tion even with an attenuated-virus vaccine. 361 "Regardless of
the care with which an AIDS vaccine is designed," they say,
"adverse reactions are inevitable."369
Nor is it sufficient to assert that, because about eleven
vaccines are in early-stage trials, seven of which are being
tested by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Dis-
eases,3 7 0 at least some manufacturers must believe that the
statutory and/or common law protections that are currently
available justify the costs of research and the risks associated
with vaccine development. Research and testing are at a
stage prior to marketing, distribution, and administration.
The General Counsel of Johnson and Johnson has said that if
his company developed an AIDS vaccine, he would not recom-
365. For example, clinics were the site of the vaccinations in Davis v. Wyeth
Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 123 (1988) ("[in] the absence of a doctor, the adminis-
tration of the vaccine for the ... clinic was delegated to a pharmacist") and, in
Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1270 (1974) ("The vaccine was admin-
istered ... by a registered nurse; there were no doctors present.").
366. See supra note 13; McKenna, supra note 145, at 949, 961; Mariner &
Gallo, supra note 70, at 18.
367. See Mariner & Gallo, supra note 70, at 21; Cloney, supra note 11, at 560
n.6 (citing Richard Cooper, For AIDS Innoculants, Ounce of Prevention Worth a
Pound of Cure, LEGAL TIMES, June 6, 1989, at 18).
368. Mariner & Gallo, supra note 70, at 18.
369. Id. at 23.
370. In Gloomy AIDS Picture, Patches of Blue Emerge in Understanding,
Awareness, Biotechnology Newswatch, Aug. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
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mend that it be marketed until Congress passed protective
legislation.37 1
Even though the "products liability crisis" may have
eased, it damaged the pharmaceutical industry.3 72 In addi-
tion, although the Supreme Court may have imposed rough
limits on the award of punitive damages, and states have also
taken steps to curb excesses in this area, large exemplary
awards are still possible.373 Juries, moreover, are sympa-
thetic to injured plaintiffs, whether a strict-liability or a neg-
ligence standard is applied, so that drug manufacturers have
good reason to be cautious. It is certainly arguable that fed-
eral legislation covering products liability in general would be
unnecessary, unwise, and contrary to principles of federal-
ism, but there is precedent, given the swine flu and childhood
vaccines, that carving out federal protection for particular
products is justified.374 The urgent need to develop an AIDS
vaccine appears to be a situation where such legislation is
warranted.
In order to determine the parameters and objectives of
such legislation, this article presents an overview of legisla-
tion affecting availability and use of other vaccines.3 75 To as-
sist in effectively reviewing this material, the following objec-
tives of the proposed federal statute provide baseline
guidance.3 76
The federal statute must provide adequate redress to
persons injured by the administration of a vaccine. It must
impose suitable rules to deter improper corporate conduct.377
Finally, it must set forth standards and procedures that
fairly adjudicate liability yet limit damage awards to reason-
able amounts.3 78 The statute should, at a minimum address
the following factors: (1) the duty of care, (2) the nature of the
fact-finder, (3) punitive damages, (4) compensatory damages,
(5) defenses, and (6) the standard of review on appeal.
371. Cloney, supra note 11, at 570.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 49-67.
373. See supra part II.B.3.
374. See infra parts III.B.1-2; Cloney, supra note 11, at 562.
375. See infra parts III.B.1-4.
376. See infra text accompanying notes 377-383.
377. For example, slipshod methods in manufacturing processes should be
deterred.
378. In addressing these objectives, Congress may deal with aspects of the
American tort system (e.g., contingent fees) that differentiate it from other legal
systems. These concerns are not the focus of this article.
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1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care was treated in the preceding section.379
In order to limit manufacturer liability, should the standard
be negligence rather than some variant of strict liability?
Should a defendant be permitted to plead conformity with the
requirements of regulatory agencies, in particular the FDA,
as a complete defense?380 In the alternative, should a manu-
facturer be completely absolved of liability in the event of in-
jury with the entire burden assumed by the government, pos-
sibly with the government having a right of redress against a
manufacturer in a case of gross or wanton negligence?
2. The Nature of the Fact-Finder
It is sometimes argued that the lottery-like quality of
American tort law is caused by the use of lay juries.3 8 Per-
haps a judge alone, or a panel of government-appointed medi-
cal experts, should determine liability.
3. Punitive Damages
The punitive damages factor also has been treated in a
preceding section.38 2 Although these damages are awarded
in only a small proportion of cases and are frequently reduced
on appeal, the enormous amounts occasionally awarded are a
major concern to any manufacturer contemplating the intro-
duction of a new product.38 3 Should the amount be capped
and given only on a finding of gross negligence by clear and
convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of the evi-
dence? Should a trial be bifurcated with evidence to support
379. See supra text accompanying notes 340-342.
380. See HUBER, supra note 52, at 47-49. In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985),
after finding no federal preemption, the court determined that compliance with
FDA regulations, though admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence, was not
conclusive on the issue. Id. at 70-71. Similarly, in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemi-
cal Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984), the
federal appeals court stated that mere compliance with federal regulatory re-
quirements does not preclude liability. Id. at 1542.
381. See Huber & Litan, supra note 359, at 22-23; Schwartz, supra note 95,
at 64, 73.
382. See supra part II.B.3.
383. See Stephen D. Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law
Leaving Scientific Disputes to Scientists, 248 SCIENCE 823, 825 (1990). In tort
actions for personal injuries, punitive damages are not available in France,
Germany, and Japan. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 72.
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punitive damages permitted only in a separate proceeding af-
ter liability is determined? Should conformity with agency
standards be a defense?
4. Compensatory Damages
Like punitive damages, should these also be capped with
a specific maximum, such as $250,000, permitted for pain
and suffering? If a higher standard of proof is imposed for
punitive damages, should a preponderance of the evidence
suffice in the case of compensatory damages?
5. Defenses
As previously mentioned, to encourage manufacturers to
produce an AIDS vaccine, it is arguable that compliance with
the standards of a regulatory agency should be a defense.
Should it also be permissible to plead contributory or compar-
ative negligence? Further, should consent be a bar to liability
if there has been sufficient warning?
6. The Standard of Review on Appeal
If a panel of experts is used for the initial determination
of liability, should judicial review be based on the same stan-
dard as review of an administrative agency determination
(i.e., upheld unless clearly erroneous)? Or should review be
de novo?
B. Other Legislative Approaches
Legislation to ensure the availability and use of other
vaccines and mollify the liability concerns of pharmaceutical
companies has been crafted by Congress in the recent past. 84
Moreover, legislation has been enacted in California to ad-
dress these same concerns in the specific context of AIDS.3 5
In addition, Congress has considered, but so far not adopted,
legislation that would modify the product liability rules of
most concern to manufacturers.3 6 All of these will be de-
scribed briefly to determine whether they contain provisions
that might be incorporated into federal legislation dealing
384. See infra parts III.B.1-2.
385. See infra part III.B.3.
386. See infra part III.B.4.
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with liability issues in the manufacture and dissemination of
an AIDS vaccine.
1. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976
Following an outbreak of swine flu in the winter of 1976,
Congress appropriated $135 million to purchase swine flu
vaccine in order to ensure its distribution. s7 However, drug
manufacturers would not release their substantial inventory
of the vaccine because their insurance carriers refused to
grant coverage. 88 The situation was regarded as so serious
that Congress enacted legislation, the National Swine Flu
Immunization Program of 1976.389 In this legislation, Con-
gress provided an exclusive remedy for injured claimants
against the United States; suits by persons alleging personal
injury or death were barred against agencies, organizations,
and individuals that manufactured, distributed, or adminis-
tered the vaccine.3 9 0 The legislation stated, in pertinent part:
the liability of the United States arising out of the act or
omission of a program participant may be based on any
theory of liability that would govern an action against
such program participant under the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred, including negligence,
strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty.3 9 '
However, if the United States were found guilty on a negli-
gence theory, the government could recover damages from
the negligent program participant.3 9 2 A two-year statute of
limitations was imposed from the time of administration of
the vaccine.39 3
The government undertook to prepare a consent form
that would provide adequate warning, but the form did not
387. See Cloney, supra note 11, at 561 n.6.
388. Id. See also Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1518 (10th Cir.,
1984).
389. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(l) (1976)). If the situation recurs, manufactur-
ers of an AIDS vaccine will in all likelihood keep it from the market unless
there is protective legislation. See Earley, supra note 277, at 369. See also Mal-
colm Gladwell, Firms Seeking an AIDS Vaccine Ask Protection: If Serum is Dis-
covered, They Say, Threats of Lawsuits Could Block Distribution, L. A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1988, at 7.
390. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1976).
391. Id. § 247b(k)(2)(A)(i).
392. Id. § 247b(k)(7).
393. Id. § 247b(k)(2)(A)(iii).
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include the unanticipated risk of contracting Guillain-Barre
syndrome, a paralytic condition, from the vaccine. 94 After
only two months, a large number of cases of this syndrome
compelled the discontinuation of the inoculation program. 39 5
Settlements and adverse judgments have exceeded $100 mil-
lion dollars. No reimbursement from a participating manu-
facturer has been sought.3 96
2. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
Following a conclusion by the Committee on Public-Pri-
vate Sector Relations in Vaccine Innovation that "the com-
mon law tort system is not able to provide predictable, rapid
and equitable compensation for vaccine-related injuries be-
cause each claim requires an extended, costly and complex
adjudication procedure that results in unpredictable out-
comes," 97 the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
was enacted .3 9  This statute aimed to provide "optimal pre-
vention of human infectious diseases through immunization"
and "optimal prevention against adverse reactions" by, inter
alia, encouraging cooperation between government and non-
government entities in research and development of vaccines,
providing efforts to encourage public acceptance of vaccines,
educating the public with respect to adverse reactions and
contraindications of the vaccines, and establishing a National
Vaccine Advisory Committee to study and recommend ways
to encourage the availability of safe and effective vaccines. 399
The immunization of almost all children against a wide range
of pediatric illnesses was required, and a no-fault program
was created for victims suffering from adverse reactions to
394. See Cloney, supra note 11, at 597.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 597-98. See also HUBER, supra note 52, at 102. It should be
noted, however, that the vaccine may, in fact, not have caused Guillain-Barre
Syndrome. Helen H. Blake, Note, The AIDS Vaccine: Legislation to Limit Man-
ufacturer's Liability, 27 TULSA L.J. 757, 770 (1992). The incidence among the
population receiving the vaccine was the same as the incident rate in the gen-
eral population. Id.
397. Edwin J. Jacob, Of Causation in Science and Law: Consequences of the
Erosion of Safeguards, 40 Bus. LAW. 1229, 1241 (1985).
398. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, 100
Stat. 3755, (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to aa-34 (1988)). See also
Mary B. Neraas, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solu-
tion to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149 (1988).
399. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2, aa-5 (1988).
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DTP and other vaccines typically used in a childhood immu-
nization program.4 0
A no-fault program-the first federal program of its kind
with respect to vaccines-is embodied in the National Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Program that was established as
part of the Act.a01 In general, its purpose is to discourage liti-
gation against manufacturers by providing more certain, if
potentially less generous, compensation from the federal gov-
ernment.4 0 2 Under the Compensation Program, a vaccine
manufacturer cannot be sued in state or federal court for
more than $1,000 for damages arising from a vaccine-related
injury or death unless a petition has first been filed under the
program for compensation. 0 3 The legislation includes a Vac-
cine Injury Table that itemizes injuries, disabilities, illnesses,
conditions and deaths associated with each vaccine that is
covered under the Program. 4  Causation is presumed for
these events if they occur within the time specified in the
Vaccine Injury Table.40 5 However, a petition may also docu-
ment (a) an illness or disability not set forth in the Vaccine
Injury Table but that was caused by a named vaccine, and (b)
symptoms of an illness or disability that did not occur within
the time period set forth in the Table but that were caused by
a named vaccine. 0 6 In these instances, a petitioner must
prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 07
The petition is filed with the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims; and a Special Master makes the initial findings
of fact and conclusions of law, then issues a decision as to
whether compensation should be awarded.4 0 8 Upon motion,
these findings and conclusions may then be reviewed by the
Claims Court, which may uphold the Master's decision, re-
mand, or issue its own findings of fact and conclusions of law,
if it determines that the Special Master's decision is arbi-
400. Id. § 300aa-13 to 14.
401. Id. § 300aa-10(a).
402. Id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A).
403. Id.
404. Id. § 300aa-14(a). This Table includes the time period in which the first
symptom or manifestation of each condition must occur after vaccine adminis-
tration in order to be eligible for compensation. Id.
405. See Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 940
F.2d 1518, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
406. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(C)(1)(c)(ii)(I) to (II) (1988).
407. See Hines, 940 F.2d at 1525.
408. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(a), (c) (1988).
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trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.40 9 A de novo review of the resulting
judgment may be had in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.410 This court may examine the Spe-
cial Master's decision again.4 1'
To recover, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that he or she received a vaccine set forth in the
Vaccine Injury Table within the jurisdiction of the United
States and that there is not a preponderance of evidence that
the illness, disability, or death was due to factors unrelated to
the administration of the vaccine. 4 2 Compensation may in-
clude reasonable past and future medical expenses, and past
and future expenses incurred for rehabilitation, special edu-
cation, vocational training, counseling, emotional and behav-
ioral therapy, and custodial care.4 3 Compensation for actual
and anticipated loss of earnings is permitted, as are reason-
able attorneys' fees and other costs.4"4 A $250,000 cap is im-
posed for pain and suffering or for death benefits." 5 Punitive
damages are prohibited, but they may be awarded if a manu-
facturer fraudulently withholds information during approval
proceedings, intentionally withholds information respecting
safety and efficacy after approval, or engages in criminal or
409. Id. § 300aa-12(e).
410. Id. § 300aa-12(f), aa-32. See Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Health
and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the court
of appeals should review Claim Court's decision to determine whether or not
Special Master acted arbitrarily in its decision).
411. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is a highly deferential form of
review. Hines, 940 F.2d at 1528. The focus is on the agency's decision-making
rather than on the actual decision, and a decision will be upheld if a Special
Master has considered all relevant evidence, drawn plausible inferences, and
articulated a rational basis for the decision. Id. (citing United States v. Garner,
767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1985)). "If the special master has considered the
relevant evidence of record, drawn plausible inferences and articulated a ra-
tional basis for the decision, reversible error will be extremely difficult to
demonstrate." Id.
412. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (1988).
413. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A)-(B). However, the Program mandates that com-
pensation shall not be made to the extent that other sources of compensation
can be obtained either under state programs or through health insurance. Id.
In addition, no health insurance provider is permitted to make payment of its
benefits to a claimant secondary to payment under the Program. Id. § 300aa-
15(h).
414. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A)-(B), aa-15(e)(1)(A)-(B).
415. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2), (4).
illegal activity relating to the safety and effectiveness of a
vaccine.41 6
The procedural mechanisms for compensation require
that, upon judgment, the applicant for compensation file an
election either to receive the compensation awarded (or not
awarded) or to file a civil action for damages for injury.
417 If
the applicant elects to accept the judgment, he or she may not
subsequently bring an action against the vaccine manufac-
turer for the vaccine-related injury or death.4 18 Payment is
made from a Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund,419
which is subrogated to all rights of the petitioner up to an
amount no greater than the compensation paid.420 The Trust
Fund is funded from a tax, not large in amount, on each dose
of vaccine sold.4 2 1 If awards exceed a certain number during
specified time intervals (up to six hundred during a four-year
period), the Secretary may refuse to accept further petitions,
and injured claimants must thereupon seek a remedy
through legal action.422
If a civil action is commenced, state law applies.42 3 How-
ever, no vaccine manufacturer is liable for injury or death re-
sulting from unavoidable side effects where the vaccine was
properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and
warnings (defined as manufacturer compliance in material
respects with all appropriate FDA requirements).424 An ex-
ception to this immunity arises where the injured party can
show conduct entitling a petitioner to punitive damages 425 or
can show by clear and convincing evidence that the manufac-
turer failed to exercise due care notwithstanding its compli-
ance with the FDA regulations.426 In addition, in what ap-
pears to be an extension of the "learned intermediary"
416. Id. § 300aa-15(d)(1), -23(d)(2).
417. Id. § 300aa-21(a)(1) (1988).
418. Id.
419. Id. § 300aa-15(i)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 9510(d)(1) (1988).
420. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-17(a) (1988).
421. 26 U.S.C. § 4131(a)-(b) (1988).
422. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-34(b)(1)-(2) (1988).
423. Id. § 300aa-22(a). The action could be commenced for negligence, fail-
ure to warn a physician under strict liability, or breach of express or implied
warranties. Id.
424. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1)-(2). This provision appears to codify Comment k of
the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) Of TORTS § 401 cmt. k (1965).
425. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (1988).
426. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(2)(B).
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doctrine to mass immunizations, the Program also grants im-
munity to manufacturers who fail to provide a direct warning
to an injured party with respect to the potential dangers that
may result from administration of a vaccine.427 If a trial
takes place, it must be divided into three stages to assess lia-
bility, general damages, and, where permitted, punitive
damages. 428
As of January 1991, no claimant had declined an award
of compensation under the Program.429 The purpose of the
statute-to provide reimbursement to injured claimants while
avoiding the hazards and delay of litigation-appears to have
been met. Nevertheless, awards as of January 1991 totaled
$74 million, and it is not clear that the Program will have
enough money in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust
Fund to compensate the victims of the increased number of
meritorious claims that have recently been filed.43 °
3. The California AIDS Statute
Many states have enacted legislation dealing with AIDS
in areas such as education, blood screening, confidentiality,
and insurance.4 3' Only California, it appears, has enacted
legislation that deals with compensating members of the gen-
eral public, not research subjects, who may be injured or
killed as a result of receiving an AIDS vaccine.432 The legis-
lature, in its findings and declarations, noted the rapidly
spreading epidemic, the critical need for a vaccine, and the
unwillingness of pharmaceutical companies "to become in-
volved in vaccine research, development and manufacturing
because of uncertain profitability and perceived and actual
427. Id. § 300aa-22(c).
428. Id. § 300aa-23(a)-(d).
429. See Cloney, supra note 11, at 596. Moreover, lawsuits against DPT
manufacturers have declined sharply, from 255 in 1986 to 47 in 1990. Id.
430. Id.
431. See Larry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS:
Legislative and Regulatory Policy in The United States, 261 JAMA 1621, 1622-
23 (March 1989). Connecticut and Massachusetts have passed statutes that
address liability arising from the administration of vaccines, the former with
respect to injuries to research subjects, and the latter, at least arguably, with
respect to an AIDS fund for vaccinees injured during experimental treatment.
See 1991 CoNN. PuB. ACT §§ 19a-590 to 19a-591c (1991); MASs. ANN. LAws ch.
10, § 35K (Law. Co-op. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991 to June 30, 1995); MASs.
ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 2E (Law. Co-op. 1990).
432. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF TY CODE §§ 199.45(r), .50 (Deering 1990).
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marketplace risks and disincentives."433 Moreover, the legis-
lature, observing that any serious obstacles to the develop-
ment of a vaccine should be removed, declared that it is "in
the public interest to assure fair compensation, if necessary
at public expense, to any innocent victim who may be injured
by an AIDS vaccine."434
To further this laudable objective, the California legisla-
ture established an AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation
Fund to pay to any person whose injury is proximately caused
by administration of a vaccine all direct medical costs, loss of
earnings caused by the injury, and damages for pain and suf-
fering up to $550,000.435 Claims against the fund are ex-
pressly limited by the amount of money in the fund, which
derives from a surcharge on the sale of each unit of a vac-
cine. 43 Applications for payment of damages are made to the
State Board of Control, and in the event of a disallowance in
whole or part, a victim may obtain a hearing before the Board
or a hearing examiner and, subsequently, judicial review
(with the court exercising independent judgment).437
There are significant limitations. No payment will be
made to the extent that damages are attributable to the
comparative negligence of the victim or arise from a vaccina-
tion administered during a clinical trial.438 Of most signifi-
cance, no payment will be made if a manufacturer has been
found liable in a court of law, and the fund is subrogated to
any claim an injured person may make against a
manufacturer.439
Originally, the statute was written so that manufactur-
ers were insulated from strict product liability for damages
proximately caused by design or warning defects or breach of
implied warranty if, upon motion and hearing, a trial judge
determined that the vaccine causing injury was unavoidably
dangerous. 440 The three criteria set forth in Kearl v. Lederle
433. Id. § 199.45(a),(b),(l).
434. Id. § 199.45(p),(r).
435. Id. §§ 199.47(d)(1)-(3), .50(b)(3).
436. Id. § 199.50(o)-(p).
437. Id. § 199.50(d)-(i).
438. Id. § 199.50(c)(1), (c)(3). It should be noted that manufacturers may
suffer the greatest exposure to liability from injuries that result from clinical
trials.
439. Id. § 199.50(c)(2), (k).
440. See Kelly G. McIntyre, Review of 1986 California Legislation: Health
and Welfare; Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome-Manufacturer Liability,
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Laboratories441 were incorporated into the statute.442 How-
ever, in 1988, the same year the California Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Superior Court,443 overruled the "unavoidably dan-
gerous" portion of Kearl, the protection afforded by the stat-
ute was eliminated.444 The statute does not bar concurrent
claims against the fund and against manufacturers,445 and
victims may receive compensation, therefore, from either en-
tity, although no payment (supplementary or otherwise) shall
be made by the state if a manufacturer is liable.446 The sur-
viving incentive to manufacturers in the statute is a state
guarantee to purchase up to 500,000 units of an FDA-ap-
proved vaccine at no more than twenty dollars per dosage.447
4. Product Liability Fairness Act
With the strong endorsement of American business, bills
to create uniform federal legislation with respect to product
liability have been introduced every year since 1982 without
reaching the Senate or House floor for a vote.448 Over this
period of time, in an effort to obtain bipartisan support, many
of the original strict limits on manufacturer liability were
either watered down or eliminated.449 Yet the attempt to
move the most recent bill450 toward a floor vote in the Senate
18 PAC. L.J. 663, 665 & n.14 (1987) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 199.49(a)(2)). Recovery based upon negligence, manufacturing defect, and
breach of express warranty was not precluded. See id. at 665. Section 199.49
was later repealed by the California Legislature. 1988 Cal. Stat. 1955 § 3.
441. 218 Cal. Reptr. 453 (1985). For a discussion of Kearl, see supra text
accompanying notes 321-330.
442. See McIntyre, supra note 440, at 664 & n.8 (citing CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.49(c)).
443. 751 P.2d 470 (1988). For a discussion of Brown, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 333-339.
444. 1988 Cal. Stat. 1555 § 3.
445. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(c)(2), (m) (Deering 1990).
446. Id. § 199.50(c)(2).
447. Id. § 199.51.
448. See Kenneth Jost, Rewriting the Rules for Products Liability, THE RE-
CORDER, Apr. 27, 1992, at 5, 15.
449. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(b)(1991); see also Robert A.
Goodman, Note, Proposed Federal Standards for Product Liability, 30 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 296, 303-4 (1993).
450. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Its close counterpart in the
House of Representatives was the Fairness in Product Liability Act of 1991,
H.R. 3030, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
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was defeated on September 10, 1992.451 It was opposed by
Democrats and some Republicans, in significant measure due
to concern that a federal statute should not encroach on an
area traditionally left to the states, particularly when state
courts and legislatures have already instituted significant
changes in product liability law in the last decade.452
Absent from the bill were a cap on punitive damages, a
general defense against liability for complying with govern-
ment standards, and a defense for products that are inher-
ently dangerous.453 However, the portions of the bill directed
to manufacturers of drugs and medical devices provided that
no punitive damages could be awarded where the drug or de-
vice (1) was subject to pre-market approval by the FDA, or (2)
was generally recognized as safe and effective under condi-
tions established by the FDA.454 Otherwise, punitive dam-
ages could be awarded only in a bifurcated proceeding at the
election of the defendant if compensatory damages were also
awarded. 455 Also required was a showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of con-
duct manifesting a manufacturer's or product seller's con-
scious, flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons
who might be harmed by the product.456 Failure to exercise
reasonable care was not in itself considered to be such con-
duct.457 The bill also encouraged parties in product liability
disputes to first engage in alternate dispute resolution before
proceeding to trial.458 In an effort to mimic the loser-pay-all
English system and thereby discourage litigation, it provided
that plaintiffs or defendants would have to pay opposing
counsel fees if they rejected settlement offers that, from their
respective viewpoints, were equal to or better than the award
of damages at trial.459 A two-year statute of limitations, ex-
cept for capital goods, was imposed to run from the time a
451. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(b) (1991). See also Robert A.
Goodman, Note, Proposed Federal Standards for Product Liability, 30 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 296, 303-04 (1993).
452. S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
453. Id.
454. Id. § 303(c)(1)(A)-(B). This defense is not available to any defendant
who has committed fraud during the approval or review process. Id.
455. Id. § 303(a), (d).
456. Id.
457. Id. § 303(a).
458. Id. § 202.
459. Id. § 201(e)-(f).
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plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the harm and
its related cause.46 °
Arguably, uniform federal standards respecting product
liability are both inappropriate and unworkable. But to the
extent there is a product liability crisis, this legislation might
have improved American competitiveness by easing the lia-
bility fears of manufacturers. On the other hand, consumer
advocates, and the plaintiffs' bar, concerned that federal leg-
islation would unfairly favor manufacturers at the expense of
injured consumers, pointed out that the data do not support
the claim that such a crisis exists.46 ' Moreover, in the last
decade, forty-one states have enacted product liability reform
measures that, in many cases, address the concerns of manu-
facturers.46 2 For these reasons and circumstances, federal
legislation was felt to be either unnecessary or harmful.463
In all likelihood, the forum for debate has now shifted to
the American Law Institute, the organization that spurred
the development of product liability law when it promulgated
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965.
In what is planned as a four- or five-year project, the Insti-
tute is planning to draft a new restatement on product liabil-
ity law.464  Its non-binding but authoritative statement
460. Id. § 304(a)-(b).
461. See Lipsen, supra note 128, at 254; see also supra text accompanying
notes 122-139.
462. See Jost, supra note 448, at 15. Twenty-five states have changed the
common law treatment of punitive damages, eleven have permitted a defense
for complying with "state of the art," nine allow compliance with government
standards as a defense, and seventeen have placed limits on pain and suffering
damages. Lipsen, supra note 128, at 248-49. In California, a seller will not be
liable if a product is a common consumer product, is inherently unsafe, and is
known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714.45
(Deering Supp. 1993). This provision, however, does not apply to prescription
drugs, and the California Supreme Court made no mention of the statute in
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). See D.O. Aitken, The Prod-
ucts Liability Provision of the Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987: An Evaluation
of Its Impact and Scope, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1481-83 (1989).
463. For example, the American Bar Association opposed federal product lia-
bility reform in the 1990 Senate hearings and proposed a compensation scheme
in place of uniform tort reform in cases where the claims in terms of number
and liability damages threaten the solvency of a significant number of manufac-
turers and the numbers of such claims have been a burden on courts. Product
Liability Reform Act, 1990: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 583-84 (1990) (statement of Robert B. McKay,
Chairman of the Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System and
James Serota, Chairman of the Committee Section of Antitrust and Law).
464. See Jost, supra note 448, at 5.
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should channel developments in this area of the law for years
to come.
C. Proposed Legislation
In summary, any legislation that attempts to address the
liability concerns of AIDS vaccine manufacturers must limit
manufacturer liability for non-negligent, harmful side effects
caused by the vaccine, yet at the same time, ensure prompt
and reasonable compensation to all vaccinees for their inju-
ries, and deter improper corporate conduct.465 Conceivably,
national health insurance might pay the medical costs of in-
jured vaccinees, but, in all likelihood, such insurance will not
modify tort liability for general damages or other special
damages arising from drug-related injuries.4 6 Moreover, if
private insurance companies are retained in the final scheme
that is enacted, as seems likely for the time being, they will
surely balk at the prospect of creating reserve funds to deal
with non-imminent and unknown injuries arising from ad-
ministration of an AIDS vaccine.467 A separate government
program will be required, one that involves a compensation
fund for this restricted purpose.
The National Swine Flu Immunization Program468 offers
a flawed approach toward the achievement of these objec-
tives, because government assumption of risk for non-negli-
gent injuries without adequate limitations on liability make
it far too open-ended in cost. An AIDS vaccine may produce
465. See generally part III.B.2.
466. On October 27, 1993, President Clinton delivered his 240,000 word pro-
posal for universal health insurance to Congress. Robert Pear, Congress Is
Given Clinton Proposal for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at Al. He
demanded passage of a reform act by the end of 1994. Id. Representatives of
both parties predict that the proposal will be substantially revised. Id. The
American Medical Association is attempting to activate physicians to lobby
Congress for significant changes. Robert Pear, Doctors Rebel Over Health Plan
in Major Challenge to President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al. Thus, at
this point, it is not possible to predict accurately what the content of the final
legislative package will be.
467. Industry analysts predict that over 500 health insurers will be driven
from the field when a final plan is implemented. Peter Kerr, Insurers Fear
They'd Be the Big Losers in a World of Managed Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1993, at All. Nevertheless, several of the largest insurers, particularly those
that have already invested in managed care networks, should survive. Id. Fi-
nancial incentives will push consumers toward the less-expensive managed
care plans. Id.
468. See supra notes 387-396 and accompanying text.
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an unanticipated symptom-as may have been the case with
Guillain-Barre syndrome in the administration of the swine
flu vaccine-and it would be an embarrassing denouement to
repeat a hasty termination of an inoculation program due to
liability costs. Similarly, the California AIDS statute suffers
from inherent flaws.469 In addition to the exclusion of those
in clinical trials, it eliminates state liability in cases where
liability against a manufacturer has been proven in a court of
law, and no restrictions are placed on the scope of that liabil-
ity.470 Manufacturers may prevail, as in the Bendectin catas-
trophe, yet still incur enormous legal costs. Moreover, a
model that involves a multiplicity of state statutes would be
unsatisfactory in light of the perceived danger. While in
many instances the piecemeal development of law in the sep-
arate states permits each state to craft its own solutions to
particular needs, uniform national legislation is still the pre-
ferred route when dealing with a crisis of national-indeed,
international-dimensions.47 1
Unlike the previously mentioned statutes, both the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 472 and the failed Product
Liability Fairness Act 473 contain provisions that may be mod-
els sufficient for the task. The former, in particular, is a use-
ful example, because it is directed toward resolving many of
the same issues, in the context of other vaccines, that are
present in connection with the manufacture and distribution
469. See supra notes 431-447 and accompanying text.
470. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(c)(2)-(3) (Deering 1990).
471. Whether such legislation would preempt state law will depend upon the
extent to which it so thoroughly occupies the field that it is reasonable to infer
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. See Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956). Matters beyond the reach of the statute
may not be preempted. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2617-18 (1992) (holding that amended §§ 1331-1340 of the 1965 Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted claims based on failure to warn
but not on express warranty, intentional fraud, or conspiracy). Most courts
have refused to hold that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act bars suits
under state law, and indeed the statute by its express terms appears to make
such suits possible. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108, 1116-17
(4th. Cir. 1988) (Wilkins, J., concurring); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F.Supp.
1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987). See also Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT
Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 685-700
(1989).
472. Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1
to -34 (1988)).
473. S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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of an AIDS vaccine.474 Indeed, as a general statutory
scheme, one might argue simply for an amendment of the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act to include injuries aris-
ing from an AIDS vaccine; the Vaccine Injury Table could be
expanded to encompass particular harms from an AIDS vac-
cine for which compensation would be allowed, and periods of
limitation could be established in which to file for compensa-
tion due to these harms. v5 As is the case with the other vac-
cines covered by the statute, manufacturers would be af-
forded substantial protection because they could not be sued
unless a prior claim for compensation had first been filed
under the Act; injured vaccinees would receive prompt com-
pensation, and damage awards would be reasonable but
limited.
While this approach is certainly commendable, there are
drawbacks. For one, AIDS may merit a separate statute sim-
ply because of the growing size of the problem and a resultant
concern that an amendment would swallow the original. It
may be wise to keep the other vaccines, with their separate
funding needs, as distinct entities. Moreover, it is not clear
how easily any problems associated with an AIDS vaccine
would fit into the Vaccine Injury Table, even though the gen-
eral approach of the statute is sound. The only means avail-
able for identifying those injuries that might be caused by
vaccination will be through data collected during clinical tri-
als, but such data will be limited in both time and scope. It
will be virtually impossible to collect data on all potential side
effects of a vaccine for every age group, racial or ethnic group,
or group that might be hypersensitive to vaccination. Thus,
the basic scheme of the Vaccine Injury Table-to presume
causation for known, potential injuries that occur within spe-
cific time periods-will be difficult or impossible to attain. Of
474. See supra text accompanying notes 397-430.
475. Causation would be presumed if the statutory criteria were satisfied.
As in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, non-specified harms, or speci-
fied harms arising after the period of limitation, would have to be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 406-407.
There is, however, an obvious problem in the context of an AIDS vaccine when
adverse reactions may not be discovered during clinical trials and in fact may
not occur until years after inoculation. See Blake, supra note 395, at 771. The
presence of HIV antibodies, without more, will not guarantee that a vaccine has
been effective, because these antibodies are present in those who eventually
succumb to AIDS; indeed, there is a danger that knowledge of their presence
may encourage unwarranted, risk-taking behavior.
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course, recipients of an AIDS vaccination (either during
clinical trials or thereafter) could receive compensation, es-
sentially upon filing a claim, for those injuries that, on the
basis of information obtained during clinical trials, are
known to be proximately caused by vaccination. But for most
injuries, until a body of information is available, causation
would have to be proven, as is currently the case under the
Vaccine Injury Table for non-named injuries or injuries that
arise after the applicable period of limitation.476
In other respects, the approach of the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act could be followed. A victim would be
required first to make a claim for compensation from a fund
established by the federal government (discussed below), and
an award from this fund would be based upon the fact of in-
jury and not the manufacturer's behavior. Only after the re-
ceipt of compensation, or the denial thereof, would a state
claim be permitted against a manufacturer, and an election
at that point (to accept the judgment or file a civil action)
would be required. In the application for compensation from
the government, an injured vaccinee would have to prove in-
jury and, presumably, causation by a preponderance of the
evidence and, as is the case under the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, that there is not a preponderance of evi-
dence that the illness or disability is unrelated to the admin-
istration of the vaccine.477
Most cases should terminate at the conclusion of the pro-
cess to obtain compensation from the government, because
most claimants will accept a known result in preference to
the hazards of litigation. The possibility of suit-and, in
some instances, the actuality-will serve as a deterrent to
improper manufacturer conduct. However, should the in-
jured vaccinee elect to file an action against a manufacturer
based upon fault, the statute should proscribe strict liability
except where there has been a failure to warn of known or
476. See supra text accompanying notes 406-407. Until a reliable body of
information is obtained, it is not possible to state what the applicable statute of
limitation should be for an unknown, but proximately caused, injury. While the
presence of HIV occurs soon after infection, other manifestations of illness (pre-
sumably controlled by the vaccine) may not arise for years. See Blake, supra
note 395, at 771. Thus, if a period of limitation is imposed, its outer limit
should be generous.
477. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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knowable risks.478 Thus, an award of compensatory damages
should in most cases be restricted to a finding of negligence,
by a preponderance of the evidence, in the manufacture or
distribution of the vaccine. Although manufacturers need
and deserve protection from unwarranted suits, they should
pay "fair damages" if they fail to take reasonable care,479
which should be defined as compliance in all material re-
spects with specific and detailed FDA guidelines regarding
both the production process and the information to be in-
cluded in a warning. These guidelines, set forth earlier in de-
tail, are meticulous as to the safeguards applied to the test-
ing, manufacture, and labeling of new drugs and vaccines.48 °
"The formal federal licensing of a new drug, medical device,
[or] vaccine.., should be viewed as the momentous matter it
really is-not as a routine and irrelevant pleasantry to be for-
gotten as soon as the first tort plaintiff walks into the
courthouse."481
Arguably, a warning should be issued to the vaccine re-
cipient directly, thereby precluding application of the
"learned intermediary" doctrine. Such direct warning to the
recipient would be needed since, in a mass immunization pro-
gram, nurses and other health workers, but not physicians,
would likely be responsible for vaccine administration. A
proper warning should set forth known and suspected side
effects and state that, to a certain extent, vaccines in general
are considered unavoidably unsafe. If it is known that cer-
tain people (e.g., by age group or ethnicity) are at higher risk
of injury, this information should be included. The warning
might also provide information as to the risks of not being
vaccinated, as well as the consequences of contracting AIDS.
Finally, a consent form reciting the limits on claims for injury
and the procedures to be followed to be eligible for compensa-
tion should be signed by every vaccinee.
Punitive damages-perhaps the greatest fear of drug
manufacturers, despite persuasive evidence that they are
awarded sparingly in product liability suits and are over-
whelmingly restricted to cases of egregious misconduct 4
2
-
478. See supra text accompanying notes 333-337.
479. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 14.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 28-42.
481. HUBER, supra note 52, at 215.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 241-248.
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should be limited, and compliance with agency standards
should be a defense. These damages should be awarded only
upon clear and convincing evidence of malfeasance.48 3 In ad-
dition, to further protect manufacturers, trial of these mat-
ters should take place in a bifurcated proceeding, as is the
case in many states, after determination of liability and com-
pensatory damages.48 4 A cap on the amount of punitive dam-
ages for a particular episode of malfeasance, arguably well in
excess of a million dollars given the financial strength of
many drug companies and the behavior required to trigger
liability, should be imposed, with the award paid into a gov-
ernment compensation fund.48 5 If the cap is not reached in
one proceeding, punitive damages could continue to be as-
sessed in subsequent proceedings until the cap is attained.
Similarly, limits should be imposed on the amount to be
recovered as compensatory damages from the government
compensation fund. Reasonable past and present medical ex-
penses, costs of rehabilitation, special education and the like,
lost earnings, and reasonable attorneys' fees should be cov-
ered. Of most importance, there should be a cap on damages
for pain and suffering; the limit of $250,000 in the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act is a reasonable compromise,48 6
and the same figure should suffice as a death benefit. The
fund should be subrogated to all rights of an injured vaccinee,
up to the amount paid, if the government elects to proceed
against a manufacturer,48 7 and an offset should be allowed
for contributory or comparative negligence.
While lay juries may naturally be employed as the fact-
finder in a state civil action, their presence should be avoided
in the petition to the government. The evidentiary burdens
imposed by a jury, and the presumptive lack of any expertise
in a body drawn at random from the community, militate
against a jury's effectiveness. Instead, administrative judges,
483. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act prohibits a fraudulent with-
holding of relevant information from the FDA, either before or after a vaccine's
approval, or criminal or illegal activity relating to the vaccine's safety and effi-
cacy. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (1988).
484. A bifurcated proceeding was also proposed in the Product Liability Fair-
ness Act. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a), (d) (1991).
485. If Congress preempts the field, it seems likely that equal protection
problems will be avoided. See supra note 186.
486. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (1988).
487. See id. § 300aa-17(a).
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masters,48 8 or panels of scientific and medical experts could
be established to evaluate claims. The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act calls for the use of masters,4 9 but in an
emerging area where proof of injury caused by the vaccina-
tion may be difficult, a panel of experts would be preferable.
Once a body of knowledge is available, the less cumbersome
use of masters can be employed. For the same reason, upon
review by the Claims Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the decisions of the panel
should be upheld unless found "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law."4 90 Instead of de novo review, the focus should be on the
rationality of the panel's decision-making process rather than
on the actual decision that is reached. This is, as the Hines
Court stated, "a highly deferential standard of review," with
the focus on whether all relevant evidence has been consid-
ered, plausible inferences have been drawn, and a rational
basis for the decision has been articulated.49 1
Lastly, the financing of the government compensation
fund should be considered. There are a variety of sources
that could be used to provide money. The federal government
could allot money to the fund from general revenues, but then
the fund would be subject annually to the competing de-
mands of other worthy causes.492 Alternatively, a tax in the
form of a surcharge could be imposed on the sale of each unit
of vaccine; unless the government becomes a purchaser, how-
ever, in many instances vaccine recipients will be too poor to
afford the cost, and distribution to them will be gratis and
tax-free. As a variation, drug companies might be required to
deposit a fixed amount into the fund for each unit of vaccine
distributed, and the federal government, from general reve-
nues if necessary, would become an insurer of last resort if
claims on the fund exhausted the amount contributed to it.
488. See id. § 300aa-12(c) to (d).
489. See supra notes 408-411 and accompanying text.
490. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e) (1988).
491. Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d
1518, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
492. Another alternative would be to mandate that each state contribute to
the fund in an amount proportionate to the number of citizens in that state who
are vaccinated. The source of the state contribution could be through a general
sales tax increase or the like.
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The price of the vaccine would necessarily rise to all purchas-
ers to cover the unreimbursed cost of distribution to the poor.
For vaccines included under the National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Act, a tax is imposed for each unit of vaccine that
is sold by a manufacturer, producer, or importer.4 93 There is
precedent, therefore, for that approach, and it may operate
effectively with respect to an AIDS vaccine. But the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act also suspends operation of its
compensation scheme if the total number of awards in a given
period exceed the number listed.494 In this eventuality,
claimants are free to initiate suits against manufacturers
without first applying for compensation from the fund, and
protection to the manufacturers ceases. 49" This is an unde-
sirable possibility, particularly when potential injuries from
an AIDS vaccine, although in all likelihood quite limited, are
unknown in scope and severity. The government must be
prepared to underwrite the fund if it becomes insolvent, or
the advantages of a statute safeguarding manufacturers, yet
providing prompt and reasonable compensation in the event
of injury, may be seriously compromised.
IV. CONCLUSION
The crisis precipitated by the onslaught of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus continues unabated.4 96 While the
need for a vaccine is acute in areas of rampant infection in
other parts of the world, there is also an urgent need for a
vaccine in this country.497 Drug companies-some with ex-
perimental vaccines already in clinical trials-are working to
develop effective preventive or therapeutic vaccines. 498 How-
ever, the possibility of tort litigation for any injury resulting
from vaccine administration will impede the manufacture
and distribution of a final product.499
There is a widespread impression within the business
community that the country has been subject in recent years
to an orgy of litigation.50 ° Upon examination, however, the
493. 26 U.S.C. § 4131(a) (1988).
494. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-34 (1988).
495. Id. § 300aa-34(b)(1).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 2-10.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
499. See supra part II.B.1.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 82-121.
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evidence for this proposition is ambiguous, but there seems
little doubt that, within the last decade-and-a-half, pharma-
ceutical companies experienced a number of damaging law-
suits, many related to vaccines. 50 1 Their concern, therefore,
is realistic. Moreover, even though there appears to be an
emerging trend toward limiting punitive damages 50 2 and
even though almost all courts impose a negligence standard,
rather than strict liability for unknown or unknowable de-
fects in the case of unavoidably unsafe products such as vac-
cines,50 3 the fear of tort liability and large damage awards
remains.
If an effective vaccine is to be brought to market, a way
must be found to limit manufacturer concerns about liability
yet provide timely and adequate compensation to injured vac-
cinees. Federal legislation is the best way to achieve this
goal. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act can serve
as a useful model.50 4
501. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57, 75-81.
502. See supra part II.B.3.
503. See supra part II.B.4; see notes 336-37.
504. See supra part III.B.2.
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